SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1939 Supreme(Mad) 430

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.
Thadi Chandrayya and Ors.
Versus
Vaitla Seethanna and Anr.
Decided On : 08.12.1939

The main legal point established in the judgment is that a court without jurisdiction cannot pass orders in the suit beyond directing the plaint to be presented to the proper court and giving a direction with regard to the costs incurred up to the time of the return of the plaint.

Headnote:

Limitation - Suit Institution Date - [Order 7, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure] - [Section 35 of the Code] - [Section 14 of the Limitation Act] - [Kannuswami Pillai v. Jagathambal (1918)35MLJ27], [Nayinakannu v. Madureswara (1895)5MLJ58], [Karumbayira Ponnapundan v. Authimoola Ponnapundan I.L.R. (1909) 33 Mad. 262], [Wuppuluru Neelachalam v. Narasinga Das (1931) 34. L.W. 252] - The court discussed the date of suit institution, jurisdiction of the court, and the application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It emphasized that a court without jurisdiction cannot pass orders in the suit beyond directing the plaint to be presented to the proper court and giving a direction with regard to the costs incurred up to the time of the return of the plaint. The court held that the suit was instituted on the date when the court was presented with the plaint which it had jurisdiction to accept, and the plaintiff cannot claim the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act due to deliberate under-valuation of relief.

Fact of the Case:

The suit was filed by the first respondent, a reversioner to an estate, seeking possession of properties. The District Munsif held that the suit was barred by the law of limitation due to the date of institution of the suit.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the suit was deemed to have been filed on the date when the court was presented with the plaint which it had jurisdiction to accept, and the plaintiff cannot claim the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act due to deliberate under-valuation of relief.

Issues: The main issue was the determination of the date of suit institution and the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that a court without jurisdiction cannot pass orders in the suit beyond directing the plaint to be presented to the proper court and giving a direction with regard to the costs incurred up to the time of the return of the plaint. It emphasized that the suit was instituted on the date when the court was presented with the plaint which it had jurisdiction to accept, and the plaintiff cannot claim the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act due to deliberate under-valuation of relief.

Final Decision: The appeal was allowed with costs throughout.

JUDGMENT

Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.

1. The question which arises in this appeal is one of limitation. The suit was filed by the first respondent in the Court of the District Munsif of Ramachandrapur. He was the reversioner to the estate of one Ramanna, which after Ramannas death devolved upon his daughter Pullamma. The reversion opened on the 3rd July, 1916, when Pullamma died. The first respondent was born on the 1st November, 1908, and therefore attained his majority on 1st November, 1926, which gave him until 1st November, 1929, in which to file the suit. On the 30th October, 1929, he filed a plaint in the Court of the District Munsif and asked for possession of the suit properties from the appellants, who were in possession under the alienations created by Pullamma. In the plaint, the properties were described in two schedules, A and B. The properties in schedule A were valued at Rs. 693 and the mesne profits thereof at Rs. 2,040. The properties in schedule B were valued at Rs. 250. In their written statement the appellants challenged the correctness of the valuation of the properties in B schedule. They contended that there had been gross under valuation. The consequence was that the District Munsif directed the appointment of a Commissioner to estimate the value of the properties. But the plaintiff deliberately abstained from taking out the commission, and from this conduct the District Munsif drew the legitimate inference that the aggregate value of the properties mentioned in the plaint was over Rs. 3,000 and he therefore held that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. On 6th August, 1930, the District Munsif accordingly returned the plaint to the first respondent for presentation to the Court of the Subordinate Judge. The first respondent took the plaint away, amended it by striking out his claim for possession of the properties mentioned in B Schedule, and later in the day re-presented it to the District Munsif. On the 11th August, 1930, the District Munsif again returned the plaint to the first respondent as he considered that it was a new suit and which necessitated the riling of a new vakalat. On the 14th August, 1930, the first respondents pleader re-presented the plaint without filing a fresh vakalat. He contended that the plaint was a continuation of the plaint which was presented on the 30th October, 1929. On the 15th August, 1930, the Court once more returned the plaint to the first respondent, intimating that it must be treated as a fresh suit. On that date the first respondents pleader re-presented it with an application that the amendment which he had made might be allowed and the plaint approved. He also asked that the plaint should retain its old number. The District Munsif agreed to this course and passed a formal order of the nature indicated.

2. The only question which arises now is whether the suit must be deemed to have been instituted on the 30th October, 1929, when the original plaint was presented, or on the 6th August, 1930, when the plaint was re-presented after it had been returned by the District Munsif for filing in the proper Court and had been amended by the elimination of Schedule B and the relief claimed in respect of the properties therein mentioned. The District Munsif held that the suit must be deemed to have been filed on the 6th August, 1930, and therefore was barred by the law of limitation. On appeal the Subordinate Judge of Rajahmundry held that the suit was in time, as in his opinion the correct date was 30th October, 1929. On second appeal Wadsworth, J., agreed with the Subordinate Judge, but gave a certificate for a further appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned Judge considered that the filing of the amended plaint on the 6th August, 1930, must be deemed to be a continuation of the suit which was filed on the 30th October, 1929 and therefore was in time.

3. We are of the opinion that the District Munsif was right and that the date of the institutio





Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Judicial Analysis

AI

SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top