The main legal point established in the judgment is that the delegation of power under Section 3A of the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873 must be in accordance with the authority of the High Court, and the District Judge cannot delegate his duties without clear authority.

Leach, C.J.

1. The respondent is a pleader practising in the Coimbatore District. In February 1937 one G. Thimmappa, a mer. chant residing and carrying on business in Bellary, presented a petition to this Court in which he charged the respondent with< professional misconduct. The Court considered that the charges made called for inquiry and passed an order directing the District Judge of Coimbatore to hold the inquiry, the case falling within Section 13, Legal Practitioners Act. When the matter came before the District Judge the petitioner filed a statement in which he said that he was satisfied that the respondent who had been his pleader for a considerable time, had not acted mala fide; and that his claim had been settled by the respondent, and he wished to withdraw the petition. In the circumstances the District Judge thought it unnecessary to proceed with the inquiry and submitted the record to this Court with his remarks. This Court considered that the District Judge should have proceeded with the inquiry, notwithstanding that the petitioner had expressed a desire to withdraw the petition. Where the Court has reason to believe that a practitioner may have been guilty of professional misconduct it cannot allow proceedings to be dropped as the result of an agreement between the complainant and the practitioner or even if the complainant without any agreement does not wish to proceed with the matter.

2. By an order dated 7th March 1939 the Court remanded the case to the District Judge with direction to proceed. Without reference to this Court the District Judge directed the Additional District Judge to hold the inquiry, which he did, and his report is now before us. Mr. Venkatarama Sastri on behalf of the respondent has raised a preliminary objection. He says that inasmuch as the inquiry has been conducted not by the District Judge, who was directed to hold the inquiry, but by the Additional District Judge, it is unlawful and the Court cannot take action on it. In other words, he says that the District Judge, having been ordered to hold the inquiry, could not delegate his power to the Additional District Judge and that this Court is precluded from giving approval ex post facto to the inquiry conducted by the Additional District Judge. The learned Advocate-General has contended that if the Court is satisfied with the report it can take action on it. He has also contended that the District Judge had full power by reason of Section 3A, Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873 to transfer the matter to the Additional District Judge. Further he has said that inasmuch as the respondent did not take objection to the Additional District Judge holding the inquiry when the matter was in the District Court but appeared and took part in the proceedings throughout he cannot now be allowed to raise the objection. I will deal first with the argument advanced by the learned Advocate-General that the finding of a tribunal of inquiry can be accepted notwithstanding that the tribunal was not appointed by the Court for the purpose. The opening clause of Section 13, Legal Practitioners Act, is in these words:

The High Court may also, after such Inquiry as it thinks fit, suspend or dismiss any pleader or mukhtar holding a certificate as aforesaid.

3. It is said that the words "after such inquiry as it thinks fit" leave it open to the Court to give approval ex post facto. I am unable to accept this argument. The Act contemplates the High Court directing an inquiry before action is taken. The Court has duties to perform under the Act and the first duty is to nominate a person or persons to hold the inquiry into the alleged misconduct. Unless the tribunal is constituted beforehand, the inquiry, in my opinion, cannot be lawful. I regard the suggestion that approval of a tribunal may be given ex post facto as being repugnant to the spirit of the Act and the wording of Section 13. The argument that because no objection was raised i" the District Court to the