The main legal point established in the judgment is the validity and binding nature of arbitration awards and compromises, especially in the context of minors and the authority of agents to act on behalf of others.

Abdur Rahman, J.

1. These appeals arise out of an order passed by the Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga on two applications, one made on behalf of the plaintiff and the other on behalf of the defendants under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil P.C. with the allegations that the parties had referred the matter in suit, which was one for dissolution of partnership and accounts, to two arbitrations which resulted in two awards. The earlier which held the plaintiff to be entitled to recover Rs. 30,000 was pleaded on behalf of the defendants and the later under which the defendants were found to be liable to the extent of Rs. 52,000 was pleaded by the plaintiff. Since it has been settled by a Full Bench of this Court in Subbaraju v. Venkataramaraju A.I.R. (1928) Mad. 1025 that where in a suit parties have referred their difference to arbitration without an order of the Court and an award is made, a decree in terms of the award can be passed by the Court under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil P.C. the only question for decision in this case is whether the subject-matter of the suit had been so adjusted between the parties. It was asserted on behalf of the plaintiff that, although the matter was referred to a private arbitration for the first time in 1935, the award given by the arbitrators was invalid and as the plaintiff was not satisfied with it, the subject-matter of the suit along with the question of the validity of the first award were referred to a second arbitration by the parties on 2nd April 1936 and resulted in the award Ex. A, under which the plaintiff was entitled to get a sum of Rs. 52,000, instead of Rs. 30,000 as ordered in the previous arbitration. It was also alleged that the defendants had accepted the later award, signed it in token of their acceptance, executed four hundis for the amount to which the plaintiff was found to be entitled by the arbitrators and delivered them to the plaintiff. He therefore applied to the Court for the adjustment and satisfaction to be recorded and the suit to be dismissed.

2. Various objections were raised by the defendants to this award although the factum of reference and the existence of a second award were not denied. No evidence was however let in on their behalf to substantiate their contentions and the learned Counsel for the appellants has therefore confined himself to certain legal objections which have to be determined in these appeals. I might state at once that in view of the plaintiffs application, it would be unnecessary to consider the award or adjustment relied upon by the defendants in their application (I.A No. 414 of 1935) unless I come to the conclusion that in view of the legal objections stressed on behalf of the defendants the second award and satisfaction urged on behalf of the plaintiff could not be sustained. If I arrive, on the other hand, at a finding that the satisfaction pleaded on behalf of the plaintiff was unassailable, the first award or adjustment must be taken to have been superseded by the later award and satisfaction.

3. The first legal objection raised on behalf of the defendants is that inasmuch as there were minors who were also defendants in the suit, the matter in dispute could not have been referred to arbitration or compromise under the provisions of Order 32, Rule 7, Civil P.C. without the leave of the Court. There is considerable force in this objection so far as it goes. No application appears to have been made to the Court in which the suit was pending for leave to refer the matter to arbitration on behalf of the minors. Even after the award was made, the guardian ad litem made no application to the Court for granting him leave to compromise the matter in suit. In the absence of any application for leave, the Court was not and could not have been called upon to consider whether the compromise was beneficial to the minors and the compromise could not therefore be forced on the minors even if the Court happened to consider it to be beneficial in their in