The main legal point established in the judgment is the entitlement of a holder in due course to recover from the maker of a promissory note, as determined by the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Leach, C.J.

1. On 10th December 1933 the respondent executed a promissory note in favour of one Maddipati Tattabayi, alias Tata, defendant 2 in the suit out of which this petition arises. The respondent saya that she paid the amount due on the promissory note two days later, but the instrument was left in the hands of the payee, who the next day endorsed it to the petitioner. The petitioner instituted a suit on the promissory note in the Court of the District Munsif of Kovvur. The District Munsif passed a decree against the respondent and the payee. The respondent then appealed to the Subordinate Judge of Ellore, who confirmed the decree so far as it affected the payee, but dismissed the suit so far as it concerned the respondent. The Subordinate Judge held that the petitioner was a holder in due course, but inasmuoh as the respondent; had paid the amount due on the promissory note to the payee he was not entitled to recover from the respondent. The petitioner filed a second appeal, but as the amount involved was less than Rs. 500 the appeal did not lie. My learned brother Krishnaswami Ayyangar, however, allowed the appeal to be treated as an application for revision under Section 115, Civil P.C., and the case has been placed before this Bench for decision.

2. The opinion of the Subordinate Judge that the petitioner was not entitled to recover is contrary to the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 9 of the Act states that the term "holder in due course" means any person who for consideration became the possessor of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque if payable to bearer, or the payee or indorsee, if payable to order, before the amount mentioned in it became payable, and without having sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed in the title of the person from whom he derived his title. Section 22 says that the maturity of a promissory note or bill of exchange is the date at which it falls due. It is to be observed that in the case of a promissory note which is payable on demand, (as in this case) it does not become payable until demand is made. On demand being made it falls due immediately : see Glasscock v. Balls (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 13, Harry Van Ingen v. Dhunna Lall Lallah (1882) 5 Mad. 108, Shaha & Co. v. Bengal National Bank Ltd. AIR1921Cal302 . Section 60 provides that a negotiable instrument may be negotiated (except by the maker, drawee or acceptor after maturity) until payment or satisfaction by the maker, drawee or acceptor at or after maturity, but not "after such payment or satisfaction." "Such payment" means at or after maturity. Section 118 says that until the contrary is proved it shall be presumed that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity, and that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course. In this case, there is no evidence of any demand having been made on the respondent before she paid the amount to the payee of the instrument and it must therefore be taken that the indorsement to the petitioner took place before maturity. According to the sections of the Act to which reference has been made the petitioner is clearly entitled to recover from the maker.

3. In Glasscock v. Balls (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 13 the Court of appeal had to consider the position of a person who was a holder of a promissory note in these circumstances. The payee of the instrument had taken from the maker a further security for the same amount in the shape of a mortgage. The payee transferred the mortgage to another person, receiving on the transfer the amount of the debt. Subsequently the payee indorsed the promissory note which remained in his hands to the plaintiff for value, the plaintiff having no knowledge of the circumstanoes. It was held that the note, not having been paid or returned to the maker, was still current at the time of the indorsement, and the plaintiff as a bona fide indorsee for value was entitled to recover upon it. Lord Bsher sa