The main legal point established in the judgment is that a right of appeal is a statutory right and cannot be inferred by implication.

Abdur Rahman, J.

1. This is a batch of thirty second appeals. A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Sitarama Rao. He contends that in the absence of a provision in the Estates Land Act conferring a right on the appellants to prefer second appeals, these are not competent and are liable to be dismissed. The question to decide is whether they are.

2. They arise out of objections made by the respondent-landholder for appraisement of the crop or division of the produce under Section 74 of the Estates Land Act. On receiving these applications, the Collector deputed an officer, as required by Section 75 of the Act, to make the division or appraisement. The Officer appointed by the Collector carried out the orders and made a report. Objections were raised on behalf of the appellants to this. They were to the effect that the rent was payable in money and not in kind. These objections were disallowed. The appellants went up to the District Court in appeal but the Collectors decision was affirmed. They have preferred the present appeals against the orders of the District Court.

3. Sub-clauses (d) and (e) to Section 75 (8) which contain the provisions relevant to the point to be determined read as follows:

(d) The Collectors order for the payment of rent and costs, if any, shall be final unless an objection of the nature described in Clause (6) has been raised and shall be enforceable as a decree for arrears of rent.

(e) Where an objection of the nature described in Clause (6) has been raised, the Collectors decision thereon shall be subject to an appeal to the District Court. Such appeal shall be presented within thirty days from the date of the Collectors decision.

4. Clause (b) referred to in these sub-clauses provides that if an objection is raised that the rent is not payable by division or appraisement or that no rent is payable and the Collector upholds the objection, he shall set aside the award made by the person who was deputed to make the division or appraisement.

5. According to the first of these sub-clauses, the Collectors order for the payment of rent and costs has been declared to be final. Since, during the course of argument, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the order passed by the District Court and the orders passed by the Collector were decrees in fact, it would be useful to remember that the sub-clause (d) does not declare the Collectors orders to be decrees but merely orders that are enforceable as decrees for arrears of rent. As to the character of the decision made by the District Court, sub-clause (e) provides that when the objection that the rent is not payable either at all or at least in kind i.e., by division or appraisement but is payable in cash, is taken on behalf of a tenant, the Collectors decision (the use of the word decision to which reference was made during the course of the arguments is not important as it obviously refers to the order passed by the Collector and to nothing else) shall be subject to an appeal to the District Court. If these two sub-clauses are read together, there would be no doubt as to, their meaning. They lay down that the Collectors order for payment of rent in kind would be final if no objection is taken under sub-clause (b) and would continue to be so even if an objection is taken under that sub-clause if the District Court on being appealed to does not come to a different decision from that of the Collector. In both these cases, it is the decision of the Collector that remains final. If the District Court takes a different view on the other hand, the order of the Collector is to be substituted or replaced by the order of the former. Whether such an order could be appealed against does not arise here for decision. But the point to be borne in mind is that in the absence of a different conclusion by the District Court, the decision of the Collector would continue to hold the field and retain its character of finality.

6. There is no provision in the Act