The main legal point established in the judgment is that a transferee of a decree, with a valid written title-deed, is entitled to execute the decree under Section 146 of the Civil Procedure Code.

King, J.

1. The respondent 1 in this appeal was the plaintiff in two suits which came finally to be numbered as O.S. No. 15 and O.S. No. 24 of 1938 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Kurnool. These were suits mainly, and in O.S. No. 15 wholly, for the recovery of money clue on promissory notes. The claim in O.S. No. 15 was for Rs. 21,788, that in O.S. No. 24 for Rs. 4,698. While these suits were pending respondent 1 on 1st November, 1937 executed a deed of transfer in favour of the present appellant. By this deed he assigned to the appellant the entire amounts due in respect of the two suits for a consideration of Rs. 8,000. The consideration was to be paid within fifteen days of the passing of the decrees in the two suits, but in no case before a date in February 1938. It was also provided that if a decree were not granted in the more important suit (O.S. No. 15) payment of the Rs. 8,000 would not be due, and any payment which might actually have been made should be refunded. On the same day (1st November, 1937) appellant executed in favour of respondent l a promissory note for Rs. 8,000 which was expressed as payable on demand.

2. Decrees in the two suits were in due course passed that in O.S. No. 15 on 22nd September and that in O.S. No. 24 on 25th November, 1938. The sum of Rs. 8,000 was not paid by the appellant within the fifteen days stipulated, and has not yet been paid. On 9th March, 1939 respondent 1 sent a lawyers notice to the appellant repudiating the transfer on the ground of the non-payment of the consideration within the stipulated time. In April, 1939 appellant applied under Order 21, Rule 16 and Section 146, Civil Procedure Code to execute the decree in O.S. No. 15. The judgment-debtor (respondent 2) remained ex-parte but respondent 1 opposed his application. The learned District Judge of Kurnool held that appellant could not execute the decree both because respondent 1 did not in fact transfer the decree to him, and also because Order 21, Rule 16 and Section 146 gave him no right to do so. Against this order the present appeal has been filed.

3. That the decree was in fact transferred by respondent 1 to appellant seems to us beyond all dispute. In the deed respondent 1 says:

I have this day transferred to you the entire amounts due in respect of the two suits.

4. This language is appropriate only to a completed transaction, and the expression sums due in respect of the suits can mean only sums decreed in the suits. That this is so is made clear by a later passage in the deed where the respondent 1 says:

The amounts due under the decrees in the said two suits are due to you only.

5. It is difficult to understand what exactly the learned Judges findings are in this matter but he appears in some way to have convinced himself both that the deed does not mean what it says and that it was not meant to be acted upon. On the former point he refers to discrepancies between the deed and the promissory note, but it is obvious from the references to the promissory note in the deed that it is the deed which embodies the agreement between the parties as to how the promissory note is to be treated, so that any discrepancies are of no importance. On the latter point the District Judge emphasises the fact that after the decrees were passed appellant did not pay and respondent 1 did not demand payment of, the Rs. 8,000 which was due; but this proves nothing whatever as to the intentions of the parties in November, 1937. This case is merely another example of the all too common practice of the purchaser of property refusing to pay for it, even though he enjoys, or claims to enjoy it.

6. The learned judge has also introduced into his judgment various irrelevant comparisons with the transactions of the betting-ring, and has stigmatised the bargain between respondent 1 and appellant as undesirable speculation in the result of litigation. We can see no justification for this criticism. The situation as disclosed by the docume