The interpretation of 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the consideration of equities based on Section 14 of the Limitation Act influenced the court's decision in excusing the delay.

Abdur Rahman, J.

1. This is an application to excuse the delay in presenting a petition for review against the orders passed by Mr. Justice Venkatasubba Rao and myself in A.S. No. 343 of 1931 on the 4th March, 1938, I have not, up till now, decided to issue any notice in regard to the petition for review and nothing in this order shall be taken to refer to the application for review which I shall consider separately.

2. Since the existence of sufficient cause is a condition precedent without which the discretion given to a Court under this section cannot be exercised, the question whether the delay should be excused depends for its answer on the fact whether the petitioner has succeeded in making out the same. According to the well-known decision in Krishna v. Chathappan I.L.R.(1889) Mad. 269 cited by learned Counsel for the appellant, the words sufficient cause have to be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice particularly when "no negligence, nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant". In defining the general rules of guidance for the exercise of discretion, Lord Dunedin observed in Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram.

We think the true guide for a Court in the exercise of this discretion is whether the appellant has acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting his appeal.

Learned Counsel for the Court of Wards has, on the other hand, naturally laid great stress on the fact that once the time for making an application is past, a very valuable right has accrued to the successful party of which he should not be lightly deprived.

3. Section 14 of the Limitation Act provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit or application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting in good faith and with due diligence another civil proceeding in another Court, which from defect of jurisdiction or other causes of a like nature, is unable to entertain it, shall be excluded. It has been contended by learned Counsel for the appellant that in considering the words "sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the equities on which Section 14 of the Limitation Act is based may be taken into account, it being a common case of the parties that Section 14 as such has no application to the present case. The contention has in my opinion, considerable force. As observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kanwar Rajendra Bahadur Singh v. Rai Rajeshwar Bali, that in applying Section 5 to cases where delay has been caused by taking a wrong proceeding, "analogy of Section 14 is an argument of considerable weight". The existence of circumstances mentioned in the section has been, therefore, regarded in decided cases as a sufficient ground for excusing the delay caused by wrong proceedings. In order to decide therefore, whether the plaintiff would be entitled to exemption, I must see whether he had been during the time that has elapsed in excess of what is allowed to him by law, prosecuting in good faith and with due diligence other proceeding or proceedings for substantially the same relief in another Court which was, for defect of jurisdiction or for other causes of a like nature unable to entertain the same and grant the relief to the petitioner.

4. There is no doubt, as a reference to the petitioners affidavit would show, that he has been prosecuting certain Letters Patent Appeals and other Civil Miscellaneous Applications between the 17th March, 1938, and the 18th April, 1939. So far as the time spent for the disposal of these appeals and applications are concerned, there cannot be much of a doubt that these proceedings must be regarded as having been taken in good faith and prosecuted diligently. Had the time to pay court-fee and to give security been extended either by the Court on the 18th February, 1938, or had Letters Patent Appeals against those orders been allowed on the 18th April, 1939, the appeal would not have been dismissed on the 4th March, 1938, and ev