The main legal point established in the judgment is that when a Hindu widow has received valid authority to adopt, her motive in making the adoption can be ignored, and her adoption should be regarded as valid.

Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.

1. The question which arises for decision in this appeal is whether the adoption by a Hindu widow of a son to her deceased husband is invalid when the widow is actuated, not by a sense of religious duty, but by an improper motive.

2. On the 8th June, 1931 one Kandulapati Gopalam died leaving two widows, the second respondent and the appellant. The second respondent was the senior widow. On the 20th October, 1931 the second respondent purported to adopt the first respondent and it is not suggested that any of the necessary formalities were ignored. On the 17th December, 1935 the first respondent filed in the Court of the District Judge of West Godavari the suit out of which this appeal arises to recover possession of Gopalams estate. The suit was subsequently transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Ellore. The first respondent alleged that Gopalam had by will given authority to the second respondent to adopt a son. He also alleged that irrespective of the will the adoption was valid as the nearest sapinda had given his consent. The appellant denied that the will had been executed by the testator and disputed the validity of the consent of the nearest sapinda. The will was not produced, but the Subordinate Judge held that the first respondent had been validly adopted because the second respondent had in fact received the consent of the nearest sapinda, and this is not now disputed. It may be taken for the purposes of the appeal that in adopting the first respondent the second respondent was not actuated by any religious motive and that her object was to prevent the estate falling into the hands of the appellant.

3. Two arguments have been advanced on behalf of the appellant. In the first place it is said that a Hindu widow cannot make a valid adoption when she has been prompted by a corrupt motive. In the second place it is said that here the consent of the nearest sapinda cannot be regarded as being a lawful consent because he gave it under the impression that Gopalam had by will directed the second respondent to adopt a son to him. The second contention was not seriously pressed and calls for little comment. The nearest sapinda was Kandulapati Bullivenkayya, the elder brother of Gopalam. He gave evidence and stated that his consent was given independently of any authority received from Gopalam. His statement was believed by the Subordinate Judge and we see no justification for disbelieving it.

4. The appellant mainly relies on a passage in the judgment of the Privy Council in The Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sethupathy (1868) 12 M.I.A. 397 which is usually referred to as the Ramnad case. It was there held that according to the law prevalent in the Madras Presidency a Hindu widow who has not received authority from her husband may nevertheless adopt a son to him if she has received the consent of his kinsmen. Subsequent decisions make it clear that by kinsmen is meant the nearest sapindas. The passage relied upon by the appellant reads as follows:

It is not easy to lay down an inflexible rule for the case in which no father-in-law is in existence. Every case must depend upon the circumstances of the family. All that can be said is that there should be such evidence of the assent of kinsmen as suffices to show that the act is done by the widow in the proper and bona fide performance of a religious duty and neither capriciously nor from a corrupt motive.

We will assume that where a senior widow adopts a son in order to prevent her husbands estate falling into the hands of a junior widow her motive is "corrupt" in the sense that it is improper.

5. On behalf of the first respondent it is contended that the widows motive in making the adoption is not really a factor and that weight should not be attached to the words "and neither capriciously nor from a corrupt motive" which appear in the judgment in The Ramnad case (1868) 12 M.I.A. 397. For reasons which we shall state we co