The main legal point established is that an administration suit should be valued under Article 17-B of Schedule II of the Court-Fees Act, and the analogy between an administration suit and an ordinary suit for accounts does not hold for court-fee purposes.

Horwill, J.

1. This petition has been filed against the finding of the District Munsif of Udumalpet in O.S. No. 46 of 1940 that he has jurisdiction to try the suit.

2. The suit was one for the administration of the estate of one Kairunnissa Bibi, for accounts and for division of the assets amongst the heirs under the Muhammadan Law. The short point that arises in this petition is whether the provisions of Section 7 (iv) (f) of the Court-Fees Act or Article 17-B of Sch.II apply. At first sight, there is a very formidable array of authority in support of the contention of Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar for the respondent that an administration suit should be treated as a suit for accounts and that, therefore, Section 7 (iv) (f) is applicable. He has cited Khatija v. Shekh Adam Husenally I.L.R.(1915) 39 Bom. 545 Shashi Bhushan Bose v. Manindra Chandra Nandy I.L.R.(1916) Cal. 890 Saraju Bala Dasi v. Jogemaya Dasi I.L.R.(1917) Cal. 634 Shivaprasad Singh v. Prayagkumari Debee I.L.R.(1933) Cal. 711 San Paw v. Ma Yin (1918) 55 I.C. 258 and Ma Thin On v. Ma Ngwe Hmon I.L.R.(1934) Rang. 512 in most of which cases it was held that Section 7 (iv) (f) was the proper provision of the Court-Fees Act to apply. Of these cases, however, only one, namely, Shashi Bhushan Bose v. Manindra Chandra Nandy I.L.R.(1916) Cal. 890 discusses this question fully and directly. That was a case where there was a trust for sale created by a debtor for the benefit of his creditors. The history in the English Courts of administrative actions was discussed; but the whole of the reasoning, the discussion, and the conclusions were confined to that particular kind of administration suit in which a creditor seeks to have administered the estate of a deceased debtor for the benefit of the creditors. If this suit had been one for the administration of a debtors estate, I should have been compelled to regard this well-considered decision as a very strong authority for Mr. Ramachandra Aiyars position that Section 7 (iv) (f) was the proper provision of the Court-Fees Act to determine both the question of court-fee and the question of jurisdiction; but can the analogy for purposes of court-fee between an administration suit and a suit for accounts be extended to other kinds of administration suits in which the next of kin, the legatee, or the executor seeks to have the estate of the deceased person administered for the benefit of those entitled to some share of the deceased persons property, and which may involve not merely the taking of accounts but the division of movable and immovable property?

3. In Khatija v. Shekh Adam Husenally I.L.R.(1915) 39 Bom. 545 the question discussed was whether the suit, which was for accounts and the administration of an estate of a deceased person, was really an administration suit or whether it was not a suit for a definite share of property. The pleadings were discussed and the learned Judges came to the conclusion that it was an administration suit. They did not discuss what provision of the Court-Fees Act to apply to an administration suit. They say:

According to the provisions of the Court-Fees Act, if the plaintiff succeeds in showing upon the accounts that she is entitled to a share in the property and assets of Tyeballi Sheikh Adam, she will not be able to obtain execution of any decree that may be passed in her favour by reason of the provisions of S 11 of the Court-Fees Act until the difference between Rs. 130 and the fee which would have been payable, had the suit comprised the whole of the amount decreed, has been paid to the proper officer. That being so there does not appear to be any reason why this should not be treated as a suit for account and for the share which may be found due to the plaintiff upon taking of such account, and if it is a suit for an account falling under Section 7 (iv) (f) of the Court-Fees Act, the plaintiff is at liberty to value it at Rs. 130 or any other sum she pleases.

Saraju Bala Dasi v. Jogemaya Dasi