IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS FULL BENCH
Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.
Sreemat Prativadhi Bhayankaram Venkata Narasimhacharyulu
Versus
The Secretary of State for India in Council, represented by the Collector of Kistna and Ors.
Decided On : 17.09.1941
Chinnammal Achi - Revenue Recovery Act - Section 59, Section 38, Regulation VII of 1828, Limitation Act - The court discussed the provisions of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, Regulation VII of 1828, and the Limitation Act. It highlighted the power of the Collector to confirm, modify, or annul an order, the time limit for instituting a suit, and the computation of time in cases of fraud. The court emphasized that the final order confirming the sale triggers the start of the limitation period.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant filed a suit to set aside a sale of immovable property under the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, alleging fraud. The lower courts held the suit as time-barred, and the appellant appealed to the High Court.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court found that the suit was not time-barred based on the interpretation of the provisions of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act and the Limitation Act.
Issues: The main issue was whether the suit to set aside the sale was time-barred under the relevant provisions of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act and the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the time for instituting a suit to set aside a sale under the Madras Revenue Recovery Act starts from the date of the final order confirming the sale, as per the decision in Baijnath Sahai v. Ramgut Singh.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal and decreed the appellant's suit with costs throughout.
Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.
1. The substantial question in this appeal is whether Chinnammal Achi v. Saminatha Malvaroyan I.L.R.(1907) Mad. 367 was rightly decided by this Court. The appellant contends that the decision conflicts with the judgment of the Privy Council in Baijnath Sahai v. Ravngut Singh and therefore cannot be allowed to stand.
2. The appellant instituted a suit in the Court of the District Munsif of Gudivada for a decree setting aside a sale of immovable property which had taken place under the provisions of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act. The allegation was that the fourth defendant had by fraud secured the order for the sale of the property. The sale took place on the 18th July, 1932, and was confirmed by the Deputy Collector on the 28th September, 1932. The appellant discovered the fraud on the 15th November, 1932, and three days later applied to the Collector for an order setting aside the sale. By an order dated the 30th June, 1933, the Collector refused to interfere and consequently on the 18th July, 1933, the appellant filed the present suit. -
3. Section 59 of the Act allows an aggrieved party to apply to the civil Court for redress, subject to the proviso that the suit is instituted within six months "from the time at which the cause of action arose." Clause 3 (3) of Madras Regulation "VII of 1828 gives full power to the Collector to confirm, modify or annul an order passed by a subordinate or assistant and to pass any further order in the case as he may see fit. Parts of the Regulation have been repealed, but this provision is still in force, and it is common ground that it conferred upon the Collector power to confirm or annul the order of sale which was passed by the Deputy Collector on the 18th July, 1932, in respect of the land in suit. The order of the Deputy Collector confirming the sale was passed in pursuance of the authority given to him by Section 38 of the Revenue Recovery Act, which directs confirmation on the expiration of thirty days from the date of the sale, if no application for an order setting aside the sale has been made. If such an application has been filed the question of confirmation of the sale remains in abeyance until the application has been decided. The fact that a Subordinate Collector has confirmed the sale does not, however, prevent an aggrieved party from taking advantage of Clause 3 (3) of the Regulation of 1828 and in case of fraud he has thirty days from the discovery of the fraud in which to apply to the Collector for redress. Section 18 of the Limitation Act specifically provides that where a person having a right to institute a suit or make an application has, by means of fraud, been kept from the knowledge of his right or of the title on which it is founded, the time limited for instituting a suit or making an application shall be computed from the. time when the fraud first became known to him.
4. The District Munsif held that the sale in question was not fraudulent and that the suit was barred by the law of limitation. On appeal the Subordinate Judge of Masulipatam held that fraud had been proved, but he agreed with the District Munsif that the suit was time-barred. The appellant then appealed to this Court. The appeal was heard by Venkataramana Rao, J., who feeling himself bound by the decision in Chinnammal Achi v. Saminatha Malavaroyan I.L.R.(1907) Mad. 367 dismissed it, but granted a certificate under the provisions of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In the course of his judgment the learned Judge clearly indicated that in his opinion Chinnammal Achi v. Saminatha Malavaroyan I.L.R.(1907) Mad. 367 conflicts with Baijnath Sahai v. Ramgut Singh but as Chinnammal Achi v. Saminatha Malavaroyan I.L.R.(1907) Mad. 367 had been decided some years after the decision in Baijnath Sahai v. Ramgut Singh he felt that he could not ignore it.
5. In Chinnammal Achi v. Saminatha Malavaroyan I.L.R.(1907) Mad. 367 certain lands were sold on the 10th July, 1901, under
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