The main legal point established in the judgment is that the adopted son is treated as a posthumous son for the purpose of inheritance in the adoptive family, and the rights of the adopted son are not affected by a partition in the undivided Hindu family.

Venkataramana Rao, J.

1. This second appeal raises a question of some difficulty and importance in the Hindu law of adoption. The facts are undisputed and may be briefly stated. One K. Ramaswami Pillai had four sons namely, defendants 1 and 2,. K.R. Karuppanna Pillai the deceased husband of the 6th defendant and K. R. Ramaswami Pillai the deceased husband of the next friend of the minor plaintiff. They formed members of an undivided family. K. R. Ramaswami died in November, 1924 issue-less leaving his widow Chellathayi. Karuppanna died in 1924 leaving his widow Parvathi the 6th defendant. Ramaswami Pillai the father died in 1929. In the middle of 1936 defendants 1 and 2 effected a partition and divided the joint family properties between themselves. Subsequent to the partition Chellathayi adopted the plaintiff on 25th January, 1937. and the 6th defendant adopted the 3rd defendant on 31st January, 1937. This suit is by K. R. Ramaswami Pillais adopted son the plaintiff by his adoptive mother Chellathayi for recovery of one-fourth share of the property. The main defence is that the adoption, having taken place subsequent to the partition, it was invalid and in any event the estate to which the defendants became entitled by virtue of the said partition could not be divested by the adoption. Both the lower Courts found in favour of the factum and validity of the adoption. In regard to the validity of the adoption Mr. Rajah Aiyar has stated that in view of the decision in Panyam v. Ramalakshmamma (1931) 62 M.L.J. 187 : I.L.R. Mad. 581 by which I am bound, he does not propose to contest its validity before me. Both the lower Courts have also held that the fact that the adoption look place subsequent to the date of partition is no bar for the recovery of the share which the plaintiff is entitled to as the adopted son of Ramaswami Pillai.

2. The question for decision is whether this view is sound. The arguments for and against the said view have been very ably presented both by Mr. Sitarama Rao on behalf of the plaintiff and Mr. Rajah Aiyar on behalf of the 1st defendant, who is resisting the claim of the plaintiff. I may at the outset state that there is no direct decision of this Court on this question. There is an obiter dictum in Krishna v. Sami I.L.R.(1885) Mad. 64 (F.B.) which is exactly in point in favour of the view that the plaintiff is entitled to claim a share. As against this view there are decisions of the Bombay High Court--(Vide Irappa Lokappa v. Rachayya Madivallayaa I.L.R. (1940) Bom. 42 .Hirachand Gangji v. Sojpal I.L.R. (1939) Bom. 512 and Balu Sahharam v. Lahoo Sambhaji I.L.R. (1937) Bom. 508 (F.B.). The quesion is which view is in accord with the principles of Hindu law as established by judicial decisions particularly of the Privy Council. In this case at the date of the death of the brothers Karuppanna and Ramaswami, the family was undivided and it continued to be undivided until 1936. It is undisputed that if the adoption of the plaintiff was made before that date the adopted son would be entitled to recover the share of his father. The question is whether the fact of partition prevents him from claiming it. The recent decisions of the Privy Council, particularly Amarendra Man Singhs case in Amarendra Man Singh v. Sanatan Singh have laid down that the power of a Hindu widow to adopt a son to her deceased husband is not dependent on the question of her husbands estate vesting in her or on the fact, of the adopted son divesting the said estate vested in any person other than the adopting widow. In the course of the judgment in, Amarendra Man Singh v. Sanatan Singh Sir George Lowndes observed at page 657 thus:

Their Lordships think, from this decision, that the vesting of the property on the death of the last holder in someone other than the adopting widow, be it either another coparcener of the joint family, or an outsider claiming by reverter, or, their Lordships would add, by inheritance, cannot be in itsel