A creditor to whom a dividend has been paid cannot be compelled to bring back the amount if the debt is subsequently expunged from the list of creditors.

Somaya, J.

1. This is a revision petition filed under Section 75 of the Provincial Insolvency Act V of 1920 and the petitioner seeks to revise the order of the District Court of West Godavari dated the 8th of March, 1939, passed by him in C.M.A. No. 139 of 1937. By that order the District Judge reversed the order of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Ellore passed by him in I.A. No. 4 of 1937, in I.P. No. 62 of 1934.

2. I.A. No. 4 of 1937, which has given rise to this revision petition was one filed under Section 50 of Act, V of 1920, for expunging the entry of the petitioner as a creditor in the insolvency. The petitioner was admitted as a creditor and a dividend was paid to him by the Official Receiver. Subsequently I.A. No. 4 of 1937 was filed for action under Section 50 of the Act. The application was resisted mainly on the ground that there were no other assets to be realised by the Official Receiver and no prospect of any further dividend, that the Insolvency Court has no power even if it finds that a creditors name ought to be expunged to make an order that the amount already paid to him by way of a dividend should be brought back by him and that therefore an enquiry on the merits was not called for in this case. If after an order expunging his name from the list of creditors, the Court could not follow it up by making an order directing him to bring back the amount that had already been distributed to him and there was no prospect of any future dividend, then it is clear that an enquiry on the merits would be wholly unnecessary. There were also other applications filed to expunge the names of other creditors from the list. These applications were all heard together by the Additional Subordinate Judge and he decided relying upon certain authorities to be presently referred to that the position stated above was the correct one and that therefore there was no need to take evidence on the question whether the various debts were really true debts. He therefore dismissed I.A. No. 4 of 1937 and also the other applications along with it. Appeals were filed in the District Court of West Godavari and the District Judge reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge and remanded I.A. No. 4 of 1937 and other petitions for enquiry on the merits. The Judge took the view that the Court has got the power to require a person to whom a dividend has been distributed and whose debt is subsequently directed to be expunged from the list of creditors to bring back the money into Court. The petitioner challenges the correctness of this order and contends that both in England and in India the position is well established that a creditor to whom a dividend has been paid cannot be directed to bring back that amount merely by reason of the fact that subsequently the debt is expunged from the list of creditors. On an examination of the authorities, I think the position advanced by the petitioner is correct and that the view taken by the District Judge is wrong.

3. In Ex parte Harper: In re Tait (1882) L.R. 21 Ch.D. 537, Jessel, M.R., while holding that lapse of time is no bar to a petitioner for expunging a debt pointed out that an order expunging the debt would only operate to prevent the creditor from participating in future dividends and that he cannot be called upon to pay back what he had already received. That was a decision under Rule 73 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, under which a trustee in bankruptcy who has admitted a proof against the estate is entitled at any time afterwards to apply to the Court to expunge the proof, on the ground that it was originally wrongly admitted. This rule corresponds to Section 50 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. At page 541 Jessel, M.R., says this:

There was no limit to the time within which a proof might be expunged. In the cases which I have already mentioned the proof was expunged on the ground that its original admission had been wrong. The new rule is in accordance with the old practice. And no