SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1942 Supreme(Mad) 122

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
King, J.
M.R.M.N. Chockalingam Chettiar
Versus
The Government of Madras, represented by the District Collector of Madura
Decided On : 25.03.1942

The existence of a specific remedy provided by an Act can oust the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, preventing individuals from filing suits for redress.

Headnote:

Sea Customs Act - Jurisdiction of Civil Courts - Section 188 - Summary

Fact of the Case:

The appellant's silk goods were seized by Customs authorities on suspicion of smuggling. The goods were confiscated without further hearing, and the appellant appealed to the Central Board of Revenue.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the appellant had no right to sue to set aside the order of the Central Board of Revenue, as the Act provided a specific remedy for such cases.

Issues: The main issue was whether the appellant had the right to challenge the order of the Central Board of Revenue in a civil court.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court found that the Sea Customs Act provided a specific remedy for challenging orders, and therefore, the appellant had no right to sue.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs.

JUDGMENT

King, J.

1. The appellant was the owner of certain silk goods seized by the Customs authorities at a place near Madura on 16th October, 1935. These goods were suspected by the Customs authorities to be smuggled and an inquiry was held by the Inspector of Customs, Negapatam, at which it is conceded that the appellant was heard and was represented by the advocates of the Tanjore Bar and that no facility was refused him to put forward whatever evidence he had to adduce or arguments he wished to present to the Court in support of his case. The records of the case were sent to the Collector of Customs and Salt Reveune who passed an order in January, 1936, confiscating the goods which had been seized, holding that they had been smuggled. This order was passed without any further hearing being afforded to the appellant. The appellant thereupon applied under Section 188 of the Sea Customs Act to the Central Board of Reveune which on the 5th May, 1936, held on revision that the order of the Collector of Customs was right and could not be interfered with. This second appeal arises out of a suit by the plaintiff for a declaration that the order of the Central Board of Revenue is not valid and binding on him. Both the learned Subordinate Judge of Madura and the learned District Judge of Madura have held that there was no right of suit and this is the subject-matter of the second appeal.

2. Section 188 of the Sea Customs Act provides that every order passed under that section shall, subject to the power of revision conferred by Section 191, be final. It is argued for the appellant that the use of the word final does not necessarily mean that in all circumstances the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is barred, and I have been referred to a recent decision of the Privy Council reported in Secretary of State for India v. Mask & Co. (1940) 2 M.L.J. 140 : L.R. 67 IndAp 222 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad. 599 (P.C.), in which the following words occur:

It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

The argument is that in the present case the provisions of the Act have not been complied with and also that the fundamental principles of judicial procedure have been violated. A very interesting argument has been developed on this question, but it seems to me that it is unnecessary for me to consider it. The argument is based upon the fact that the word adjudged in Section 182 requires that the official who is adjudging confiscation must do so by a judicial order and cannot pass a final order without personally hearing the person against whom it is to be passed. Therefore in refusing to give a personal hearing to the appellant the Collector of Customs was infringing the provisions of the section. The fundamental principles of judicial procedure also include the right of the appellant to be heard and to be heard not only by a subordinate official but by the official who is to pass the order against him. In the present case there is no doubt at all that the appellant was heard, but he was heard not by the Collector of Customs but by the Inspector of Customs; nor can there be any suggestion that he was prevented in any way from adducing all the evidence which he wished to adduce and proving any fact which he wished to prove. As the learned District Judge has held, all the records of the case must be assumed to have been before the Collector of Customs when he passed his order and it cannot be said that the order was passed without the appellant having had an opportunity of putting forward his case, even though he was not present in person or by advocate before the Collector of Customs. It has been found that the written arguments that were submitted to the Inspector of Customs must have been before the Collector of Custom



Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Judicial Analysis

AI

SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top