The main legal point established in the judgment is that a suit on a negotiable instrument is prima facie a personal claim, and only the defendant is liable to satisfy the decree unless it directs payment from family property.

1. One Linga Reddi and his nephew, the plaintiff in this case, were joint in estate. On the 24th July, 1930, Linga Reddi executed a promissory note for Rs. 400, in favour of one Bhimakka, who in 1932 instituted a suit to enforce payment. The payee obtained a decree and in execution proceedings attached immovable property belonging to the family. The property was sold by the Court and was purchased by the defendant, to whom a sale certificate was granted on the 27th November, 1933. When the defendant attempted to enter into possession he was obstructed by the plaintiff. Consequently the defendant applied to the Court for an order directing the removal of obstruction and on the 6th February, 1936, his application was granted. Thereupon the plaintiff filed the suit which has given rise to this appeal. He contended that as he was not a party to Bhimakkas suit his share in the property attached by the decree-holder was not liable to be sold. Although Linga Reddi was the manager of the family the suit had been filed against him personally and there was no suggestion in the pleadings or in the decree that the debt had been incurred for a family necessity. The defendants reply was that as Linga Reddi was in fact the manager of the family, as the debt had been incurred by him for a family necessity and as the property had been sold without any reservation the interests both of Linga Reddi and his nephew therein had passed to him. It is common ground that the property was attached as the property of Linga Reddi and not as property belonging to the joint family.

2. The District Munsiff held that the plaintiffs claim was well founded and declared that he was entitled to be restored to possession of the property, subject to the defendants right to obtain possession of Linga Reddis share in a separate suit for partition. The District Judge concurred in the judgment of the District Munsiff and in doing so relied on the decision of this Court in Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Muthu Chelliah Goundan (1934) 68 M.L.J. 104. The defendant appealed to this Court and Abdur Rahman, J., held that the interests of Linga Reddi and his nephew in the property in suit had passed to the defendant. The learned Judge considered that the case fell within the decision of the Pull Bench which decided Venkatanarayana v. Somamju (1937)2MLJ251 , where the opinion was expressed that earlier decisions of this Court which were in the plaintiffs favour had been overruled by the Privy Council. The present appeal is under the Letters Patent from the judgment of Abdur Rahman, J.

3. The decisions of this Court which preceded Venkatanarayana v. Somaraju (1937)2MLJ251 and in the first place call for examination are Veeraraghavamma v. Samiudrala I.L.R. (1885) Mad. 208, Guruvappa v. Thimma I.L.R. (1887) Mad. 316, Sethuvayyan v. Muthuswami I.L.R. (1888) Mad. 325, Subramanian Chettiar v. Sivaswami Chettiar (1927) 54 M.L.J. 278 and Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Muthu Chelliah Goundan (1934) 68 M.L.J. 104.

4. Veeraraghavamma v. Samudrala I.L.R. (1885) Mad. 208 was decided by Turner, C. J. and Muttuswami Aiyar, J. There a joint family consisted of two brothers, the younger of whom was a minor. A creditor brought a suit against the elder brother on a promissory note executed by him, and having obtained judgment attached property belonging to the family. The promissory note was executed by the elder brother in renewal of one executed by the father. The elder brother was not sued as the manager of the family and the decree was not drawn up as a decree to be executed against him in that character or to be satisfied out of family property. In the words of Turner, C.J., for ought that appeared on the face of the decree, the relief was awarded to the plaintiff against the defendant as for a purely personal liability. The younger brother brought a suit to set aside the attachment and the Court held that he was entitled under the circumstances to have it removed. The Court considered the decision of