The main legal point established in the judgment is that an adopted son has the right to demand a re-partition of the family estate, as the principles of Hindu Law recognize the adopted child as standing in the place of a child actually begotten by the father, and the adoption dates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father.

Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.

1. This appeal raises the important question whether a son adopted to a deceased coparcener is entitled to reopen a partition of family property effected by the surviving coparceners before the adoption took place.

2. One K. Ramaswami Pillai had four sons, two of whom survived him. They are the 1st and 2nd defendants in this suit. The other two sons were K. R. Karuppanna Pillai, the deceased husband of the 6th defendant, and K. R. Ramaswami Pillai, the deceased husband of Chellathayi, the adoptive mother of the plaintiff, who is a minor. The father and his sons were joint in estate. Both Karuppanna and Ramaswami died without issue in 1924. The father died in 1929 and in 1936 the 1st and 2nd defendants partitioned the family estate between themselves. Admittedly each is still in possession of a moiety of the estate. On the 25th January, 1937, Chellathayi adopted the plaintiff and a week later Karuppannas widow adopted the 3rd defendant.

3. The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed by the adopted son of Ramaswami, suing through his mother as his next friend, He claimed to be entitled to recover one-fourth of the family estate. The 1st and 2nd defendants resisted the claim. Their main contentions were that the widow had no power to adopt after the partition of the family property and that in any event the plaintiff could not claim a re-partition. The suit was tried by the Additional Subordinate Judge of Madura, who granted the plaintiff the decree which he sought. This decision was concurred in by the District Judge on appeal. Both Courts were of the opinion that the plain-, tiff had been lawfully adopted and that the partition did not debar him from recovering a one-fourth share as the son of his father. The 1st defendant then appealed to this Court. The appeal was heard by Venkataramana Rao, J., who agreed with the Courts below that the partition of the estate by the 1st and 2nd defendants did not prevent the plaintiff from recovering his one-fourth share in the estate. The validity of the adoption was not challenged before Venkataramana Rao, J. The present appeal is from the judgment of the learned Judge and the sole question is whether the plaintiff has the right to demand a re-partition.

4. It has long been established that where property is taken by survivorship the widows power to adopt is not affected. See Sri Virada Pratapa Raghunath Deo v. Sri Brojo Kishore Patta Deo, Bachoo Hurkisondas v. Mankorebai (1907) 17 M.L.J. 343 : L.R. 24 IndAp 107 : I.L.R. 31 Bom. 373 (P.C.). , Yadao v. Namdeo (1921) 42 M.L.J. 219 : L.R. 48 IndAp 513 : I.L.R. 49 Cal. 1 (P.C.). An adoption does not, however, affect the rights of an alienee of family property when the alienation is lawful, and, therefore, when surviving coparceners alienate family property, as they have the right to do, the adoption by the widow of a deceased coparcener of a son to her husband does not defeat the alienee. For the appellant it is argued that a partition amounts to alienation of the family properties and the surviving coparceners are in the same position as stranger alienees. We are not prepared to accept this proposition. The partition does not mean the extinction of the family. The members of the family are still there and so are the family assets. If the law recognises in an adopted son of a deceased coparcener the right to share in the estate as it existed before the partition, property which has not been lawfully alienated in the meantime is still within his reach. The question which falls for decision in this appeal cannot be decided on such a technical plea. In deciding the question whether the adopted son is entitled to demand from the erstwhile coparceners his share regard must be had to principles of Hindu Law, and we will now proceed to examine those principles.

5. The adoption of a son by a widow to her deceased husband is deemed to date back to the husbands death, as the Privy Council has frequently pointed