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1942 Supreme(Mad) 309

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Byers, J.
Sree Raja Kandimalla Venkata Rama Narasimha Rao Bahadur Zamindar
Versus
Sri Inuganti Sitha Ramachandra Rao and Anr.
Decided On : 31.08.1942

The decree conclusively determines the rights of the parties, and claims should have been raised as defenses during the original suit. The only way to attack the decree is by setting it aside and not by way of a declaration.

Headnote:

Revision Petition - Execution of Decree - Civil Procedure Code, Section 2, Section 47 - The court discussed the validity of an agreement alleged to have been entered into prior to the institution of the suit, which purportedly prevented execution against the petitioner. The court held that the decree conclusively determined the rights of the parties and that the petitioner's claims should have been raised as defenses during the original suit. The court also emphasized that the only way to attack the decree was by setting it aside and not by way of a declaration. The valuation of such a suit was found to come within the scope of the Court-Fees Act.

Fact of the Case:

A suit on a promissory note was brought against the makers and the petitioner, who claimed that an agreement had been entered into between himself and the decree-holders prior to the institution of the suit, preventing remedies against him. The petitioner sought a declaration that the decree was not executable against him and for consequential relief.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the decree conclusively determined the rights of the parties and that the petitioner's claims should have been raised as defenses during the original suit. The court also held that the only way to attack the decree was by setting it aside and not by way of a declaration.

Issues: Validity of the alleged agreement prior to the institution of the suit, nature of the relief sought by the petitioner, and the scope of Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the decree conclusively determined the rights of the parties and that the petitioner's claims should have been raised as defenses during the original suit. The court also held that the only way to attack the decree was by setting it aside and not by way of a declaration.

Final Decision: The petition was ordered to be dismissed with costs, and the petitioner was given 21 days to make the deficit payment.

JUDGMENT

Byers, J.

1. The essential facts leading to this revision petition are that a suit on a promissory note was brought against the makers and also against the present petitioner, in whose favour the note had been executed and by whom it had been endorsed to the plaintiffs in that suit for consideration. A decree was obtained against the makers and also against the petitioner and his two sons. In execution of that decree some of the petitioners property was sold and he eventually brought a suit in the District Judges Court at West Godavari for a declaration that the decree was not executable against him and for consequential relief in the shape of setting aside the execution sales already held together with an injunction preventing further execution against him. The basis of this claim to avoid execution was an agreement which the petitioner alleged had been entered into between himself and the decree-holders prior to the institution of the suit on the note to the effect that no remedies should be claimed against him. Although the plaint was for a declaration with consequential relief which the petitioner valued at an arbitrary figure of his own, the learned District Judge found that in effect it was a suit to set aside the decree in so far as it bound him and must therefore be valued for purposes of court-fee accordingly. The petitioner was called upon to pay court-fee of Rs. 3,352-7-0 within a period of two weeks. This he failed to do but the consequential dismissal of the suit was avoided by an order staying further proceedings. It is against this order calling for additional court-fee that this revision petition has been brought.

2. The learned advocate for the petitioner relies on the case of Papamma v. Venkayya AIR1935Mad860 . That was a case in which an agreement had been entered into subsequent to the institution of a suit but before obtaining the decree. This agreement that execution was not to proceed against one of the parties was set up in the course of execution proceedings. The subordinate Judge found in that case that the agreement was true and could be successfully pleaded in bar of execution. The matter was taken in appeal and the Full Bench held that such an agreement could be set up in execution. . There is, however, an important distinction to be drawn between the facts of that case and the facts of the present case. In the case reported the agreement relied upon was entered into after the institution of the suit but before the passing of the decree, but in the case now under consideration the agreement is alleged to have been entered into before the suit was ever filed. According to the facts set out in the plaint the endorsement of the promissory note by this petitioner in favour of the decree-holders was without any right of recourse and this plaint asserts that the petitioner and his two sons were added only nominally or formally, there being a prior agreement that the decree was not to be executed against them. If the petitioners endorsement was without any right of recourse, it is difficult to see what relief could have been obtained against him. If there was no right of recourse and there was this prior agreement that execution should not be levied against him and his sons, it is unbelievable that the plaint in that suit would not have contained a statement that no relief was asked for against this petitioner and his sons. Moreover, it is to be expected that the petitioner and his sons would have raised the obvious plea that they were unnecessary parties to the suit and that no relief could be claimed against them because the endorsement had expressly been made without any right of recourse. However, these are questions of fact with which the Court is not at present concerned.

3. The definition of a decree in Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code is in the following words:

Decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines t




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