The main legal point established in the judgment is the validity of the adoption ceremony under Hindu law, including the competence of the widow to adopt and the requirements for giving and acceptance in adoption.

Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.

1. The main question in this appeal is whether the first respondent is the adopted son of one Suryaprakasa Rao, an inamdar of Tirupathi in the Godavari District. Suryaprakasa Rao died, in the year 1914, and it is the first respondents case that his widow adopted him as a son to her deceased husband in 1928, the consent of the nearest sapinda having been obtained. The appeal also challenges the validity of three alienations made by the widow before the adoption. The Subordinate Judge held that the adoption of the first respondent was valid and that the alienations were not binding on him. The suit was filed by the first respondent for a declaration that his adoption was valid and for an order setting aside the alienations. The appellants are the sixth defendant who bought 1.36 acres of land from the widow, the legal representatives of one Peda Subbanna in whose favour the widow executed a usufructuary mortgage of another property, and the legal representatives of another person named Subbanna who was also a mortgagee of land belonging to Suryaprakasa Raos estate.

2. The appellants challenge the correctness of the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the first respondent was validly adopted on two grounds. In the first place they say that when the widow adopted the first respondent, she was unchaste and therefore under Hindu law could not adopt a son to her husband. In the second place they say that the adoption ceremony was not valid because the widow did not herself receive the boy direct from the hands of the natural father, but through agents appointed by her for this purpose. In Sayamalal Dutt v. Saudamini Dasi (1870) 5 Beng.L.R. 362, the Calcutta High Court held that a Hindu widow who was living in concubinage and was in a state of pregnancy resulting from such concubinage was incompetent to receive a son in adoption to her deceased husband. The Court has been informed that there is no decision of this Court on the question; but I think that it may be taken that a Hindu widow cannot lawfully adopt in the circumstances like those set out in the report of Sayamalal Dutt v. Saudamini Dasi (1870) 5 Beng.L.R. 362. It is not necessary to consider to what length the Hindu law goes in this respect, because it is quite clear that the evidence in this case does not prove that the widow was unchaste at the time she made the adoption.

3. When her husband died in the year 1914, the widow was only 11 years of age. The village schoolmaster, the priest, and the karnam have all given evidence on this question and they are in agreement that the widow was not living, and according to them she had never lived an immoral life.

4. The appellants rely on a statement of the widow herself when in the witness box. The statement is to the effect that four years after her husbands death, she lived with one Venkatachalapathy. The Subordinate Judge has refused to believe this because the widow has now repudiated the adoption and is supporting the alienees. Even if it were true that four years after her husbands death she became the mistress of the person mentioned, that in itself would not mean she could not make a valid adoption in the year 1928. I will assume for the purposes of this case that her evidence as to what happened four years after her husbands death is true; but before the appellants can succeed on this point, they must show that she was living an immoral life in 1928. Admittedly the evidence does not go to this "extent. In fact, Behara Tammiraju, the third witness called for the contesting defendants, stated that the widow had repented of what she had done. Mr. Somasundaram for the appellants has very properly stated that the Hindu law will not regard a widow as unchaste because of her conduct many years before the adoption. The appellants have entirely failed to prove immorality against the widow in recent years, and I have no hesitation in concurring in the opinion of the Subordinate Judge that the