The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Section 64 of the Code in determining the rights of decree-holders and the effect of setting aside a sale on attachment.

King, J.

1. The appellant here held a decree against one Doraiswami, the second defendant in the suit from which this second appeal arises. Another decree-holder against the same Doraiswami was one Nalluswami Nayudu. Nalluswami Nayudu had brought certain property belonging to Doraiswami to sale in execution of his decree on the 29th August, 1934, and three other decree-holders including the present appellant had applied for rateable distribution. Meanwhile, however, Doraiswami applied first under Rule 90 and then under Rule 89 of Order 21, for setting aside the sale. Upon filing the application under Rule 89, he no longer pressed the application under Rule 90, which was dismissed. The application under Rule 89, was eventually allowed and the sale set aside on the 31st of October, 1934.

2. In the meanwhile two events happened. On the 20th of September, the judgment-debtor sold the property which was the subject-matter of the sale to the plaintiff and on the 29th September, the appellant who had filed an execution application for the attachment of this property on the 29th of August, had the attachment effected. Further proceedings in E.P. No. 888 of 1934 included a claim petition by the plaintiff based upon his sale deed from the second defendant and after it was dismissed the present suit was filed by the plaintiff on the 13th of March, 1935.

3. The plaintiffs suit has been resisted by the appellant on the ground that the sale deed from the second defendant to the plaintiff conveys no title which can be enforced against the rights of the appellant under Section 64 of the Code. As the lower appellate Court has decided against the appellant on this point the present second appeal has been filed.

4. The appellant relies upon what one might call a general impression of the rights conveyed by Section 64, without too close a scrutiny of the actual language of the section. He argues that because he has made a claim on the 29th of August, 1934, which would obviously come within the explanation to S.. 64, he can now in the circumstances which have obtained during the pendency of the plaintiffs suit rely upon that claim which was then made. It seems to me quite obvious that in deciding the relative rights of the plaintiff and the appellant we must consider the situation as it existed after the filing of the plaintiffs suit. There can, in my opinion, be no doubt that when the plaintiff filed his suit in March, 1935, the appellant could no longer make any claim for rateable distribution of the assets received from the sale of this property on the 29th of August, 1934. He cannot possibly therefore be said to be making any claim in this suit against the plaintiff based upon the explanation to Section 64 or his action on the 29th of August 1934. In order to make a claim against the plaintiff he must establish that there is some attachment on the basis of which he has a claim enforceable against him. Of course, if he could argue successfully that the attachment which formed the basis for the sale on the 29th of August, 1934, had continued to exist in spite of the setting aside of the sale then he might rely upon Section 64 as giving him a claim against the plaintiff. It seems to me however obvious that the result of setting aside the sale is to put an end to that attachment. Whatever rights the other creditors might have under S.. 73, there was only one creditor who attached the property. The attachment proceeded logically to a sale and when that creditors sale was set aside and his claim was satisfied it seems to follow beyond all doubt that that particular attachment had come to an end. I am of the opinion, therefore, that it is impossible in any circumstances for the appellant here to say that he now has a claim enforceable under the earlier attachment which was effected in 1934, before the sale of the 29th of August. I have been referred to two Pull Bench rulings of this Court in Annamalai Chettiar v. Palamalai Pillai AIR1918Mad127 an