The judgment establishes the principle that the rights of reversioners and the impact of minority status on the limitation period are crucial in determining the validity of alienations and the right to challenge them.

Somayya, J.

1. The plaintiffs who are the appellants in this second appeal filed the suit for a declaration that certain alienations of the properties of their maternal grandfather are not binding on them after the death of their mother who was impleaded as the second defendant. The suit was dismissed by both the lower Courts but on different grounds.

2. The defendant raised two defences; one was that as a" result of a certain compromise, the second defendant became the absolute owner and the other was that the suit was barred by limitation.

3. The trial Court holding that the compromise conferred an absolute right on the second defendant dismissed the suit on that ground. The appellate Court held that under the compromise the second defendant did not get an absolute interest; but upheld the dismissal of the suit on the ground of limitation.

4. The plaintiffs appeal and urge that the suit is not barred and the respondents urge that the compromise validly conferred an absolute right on the second defendant. Hence both the questions have to be decided in this second appeal. On the first question I agree with the Subordinate Judge that the compromise does not confer an absolute right on the second defendant. Seenureddi, the maternal grandfather of the plaintiffs died about 1902 and the plaintiffs case is that Papireddi the father of Seenureddi had become divided from his fathers brothers grandson Balureddi in or about 1898. After Seenureddis death, his widow and his mother together executed a sale of some properties to the fourth defendant herein. Baluredai sold the same properties to one Ramachandra Naidu evidently on the footing that there was no division between himself and Papireddi and that he got the properties by survivorship.

5. The fourth defendant then filed a suit impleading Balureddi, the widow, the mother and the daughter of the last male holder Seenureddi. The suit was compromised and the terms of the compromise are set out in Ex. A. Under Ex. A, the division between Papireddi and Balureddi is recognised as having taken place. Under this compromise, subject to certain conditions with which we are not now concerned, the widow and the daughter were given the right to enjoy the properties with absolute rights. It is clear that there was a division between the two branches. It is not said in this suit that there was no division; in fact the compromise itself recognised the division. This being so, it is not open to the limited owners and the reversioners acting together to confer absolute rights on the limited owners. The Subordinate Judges view is clearly right.

6. The next question is one of limitation. Though the defendants in this suit claim under different private and Court sales, they are all for discharge of the mortgage under Ex. C, which is a renewal of the mortgage under Ex. B. Both these were executed in 1920. At that time the nearest reversioner was Balureddis son, Munivenkata Reddi, an infant one year old. Balureddi had evidently died before then. The present suit is filed by the two plaintiffs who were born later, the first plaintiff having been born in 1922.

7. Munivenkata Reddi is still alive and a suit by him would be in time if filed before 1940. The present suit was filed in 1937. Plaintiffs being daughters sons are now the nearest reversioners and Munivenkata Reddi has become a remoter reversioner. As long as Munivenkata Reddi was the nearest reversioner the right of action vested in him and plaintiffs having stepped on their birth into that position, they should, I think, have at least the same period as Munivenkata Reddi had to file the suit.

8. When the alienation was made it was open to attack in a suit filed before 1940. How then is it cut down merely because others take the place of the nearest reversioner? This is not a case where after the expiry of the period for a suit by the then nearest reversioner, another reversioner wishes to take the benefit of his own minority under Section 6 of the