The central legal point established in the judgment is the vesting of the commutation amount in the Official Assignee, the distinction between pension and commuted sum of money, and the insolvent's duty to account for the amount received.

Chandrasekhara Ayyar, J.

1. The Official Assignee took out this application for an order to direct the insolvent Manickavelu Mudali to pay to him from and out of the commutation sum received by him a sum of Rs. 5,700. The insolvent was the Head Clerk in the Office of the Post-Master General, Madras, on a salary of Rs. 220, per mensem. He retired from service from the 1st June, 1941 on a pension of Rs. 101-10-0. He commuted one half of his pension and received a consolidated sum of Rs. 7060-14-0 as commutation. He did not pay any portion of this com-mutation sum to the Official Assignee, nor did he appear before him for examination though called upon to do so. The Official Assignee had to obtain a warrant on the 11th September, 1941.

2. The insolvent told the Official Assignee that he had paid most of the amount received by him to his creditors and he handed over a sum of Rs.. 500 only to the Official Assignee. He then gave a list of persons to whom he made payments and of what amounts. The Official Assignee was not satisfied with the story and has come forward with this application. Dividends to the extent of 0-3-9 have been declared, but the Official Assignee is of opinion, and rightly if I may say so, that more could be realised from this insolvent for the benefit of the creditors.

3. It was contended on behalf of the insolvent by Mr. Varadaraja Mudaliar that the commutation amount received by his client would not vest in the Official Assignee as it partakes of the nature of pension. He also argued that the payments made by the insolvent could not be questioned by the Official Assignee as there was no intervention by him before the payments were made.

4. Both the contentions appear to me to be untenable. The decision in Gopalachariar v. Deepchand Sowcar AIR1941Mad207 , has little bearing on the question now at issue. There Pandrang Row, J. held that an amount that was in process of transmission through post to a retired Government servant as commutation of his pension was not liable to attachment at the hands of his creditors; and he came to this conclusion because of the particular language employed in Section 11 of the Pensions Act, which provides--I am omitting the unnecessary words--that no money due or to become due on account of any such pension or allowance shall be liable to seizure, attachment or sequestration. The learned Judge held that the amount was money due on account of pension. We have no such language to construe in the case before us. After-acquired property of an insolvent vests in the Official Assignee, though, so long as the money was payable as a pension month after month, it was not attachable and was therefore beyond the reach of the Official Assignee. But it shed this character as soon as it was converted into a lump sum payment as the result of commutation. It was so held in Municipal Council Salem v. Guriirajah Rao, (1934) 68 M.L.J. 118 : I.L.R. Mad. 469. In that case the distinction between a pension and a commuted sum of money in lieu of pension was pointed out, following the decision in Crowe v. Price (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 4290 where it was decided that commutation money was alienable and liable to be taken in execution. Two cases relating to provident fund deposits are found reported in Ranganayaki Animal v. The Official Assignee of Madras (1930)61 M.L.J. 354 and Walchand Molaji v. Charles A. Williams I.L.R. (1935) 59 Bom. 517 where also it is pointed out that once the money ceases to be a compulsory deposit and comes into the hands of the insolvent, it becomes subject to the . claim of the Official Assignee.

5. The well-known case of Cohen v. Mitchell (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 262 dealing with after-acquired property has no relevancy to the point now under consideration. It is perfectly true that, until the trustee intervenes, all transactions by a bankrupt after his bankruptcy with any person dealing with him bona fide and for value in respect of his after-acquired property, whether or not with knowl