The main legal point established in the judgment is the assessment of evidence in cases of forgery and abetment, leading to the acquittal of the third accused and the affirmation of the convictions of the first and second accused.

Horwill, J.

1. The third accused (appellant in C. A. No. 206 of 1942) has been convicted by the Sessions Judge of Kurnool of an offence punishable under Section 467, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment. Accused 1 and 2 (appellants in C. A. Nos. 205 of 1942 and 206 of 1942, respectively) have been found guilty of abetting that offence and have been sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment.

2. The document which is said to be forged is a karar or relinquishment deed; and it is the prosecution case that this document was forged in order to support the title of the second accused--and incidentally that of the first accuseds father-in a dispute between the second accused and his brother, P. W. 1.

3. The principal evidence that this document is forged is that of P.W. 2, supported by P. Ws. 3 and 4, that this karar which purported to have been executed five years before was shown to P. W. 2 and he was asked to attest it. Fortunately for him and for the complainant, P.W. 1, P. W. 2 did not meekly attest this document but read it through. He then suspected that this might not be a genuine document and insisted on taking it away in order to show it to P. W. 1, who according to the document had executed it. P. W. 3 heard the first accused and P. W. 2 arguing about this karar and the latter saying that he would take it away and show it to respectable people to find out if it was genuine. P. W. 4 was the first person to whom P. Ws. 2 and 3 showed the document. There are no adequate reasons for doubting the truth of this evidence. The document has been produced and it purports to have been written by the third accused. , These witnesses are of a different community from that of the parties, and although it appears that P.Ws. 3 and 4 have appeared on opposite sides in two litigations to that in which relatives of the first accused appeared; yet nothing has been said against the evidence of P. W. 2; and there is no reason to doubt that P. Ws. 3 and 4 also knew of what had happened on the day when P. W. 2 says that the second accused showed him the document.

4. When the accused were asked what they had to say about the case, the second. and third accused said that the karar was written by the third accused, but that it was done under the instructions of P. W. 1 jointly with the second accused. It is argued that the Judge ought not to have put questions to the 2nd and 3rd accused which elicited these replies from them. With regard to the third accused, I think this objection is well founded. There is no evidence that he forged the document or had anything to do with the forgery. His name appears on the document; but nobody was asked whether the signature or the writing of the body of the document was in the hand of the third accused; and so there was no evidence that the document was written by the third accused or signed by him as a writer. It is not, in the words of Section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, "a circumstance against him " that his name appears on the document, unless there is reason to believe that his name appeared there with his knowledge. If there were no circumstances appearing against the third accused in the evidence, then unquestionably the learned Sessions Judge should not have put him any questions at all; because Section 342 says that the Court shall put questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstance appearing in evidence against him. Any statement made by an accused person as a result of questions improperly put to him could not therefore be taken into account against him. That means that there was no case against the third accused and he should have been acquitted.

5. The same argument has been put forward with regard to the second accused, but his case is not quite the same. I agree with Mr. Vepa that the letter purporting to have been written to P. W. 1 by the vakil of the second accused is not evidence against the second accused; b