The main legal principle established in the judgment is that the filing of a suit for a declaration of the right to attach property under Order 21, Rule 63 of the Civil Procedure Code interrupts the running of time in favor of the person in adverse possession, and the rights of the parties at the date of the institution of the suit must be considered.

Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.

1. The main question in this appeal is whether a suit filed by a decree-holder under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, to declare his right to attach certain property arrests the running of limitation in favour of a person in adverse possession of the property.

2. The parties are Mohammadans and are relations. The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Chingleput by A. Abdul Gaffoor, who died during its pendency. Thereupon his widow, Fatima Bibi, and his daughter, Bathla Bibi, continued the suit as his legal representatives. The first defendant is the brother of the deceased plaintiff and the second defendant is his sister. The second defendant is the widow of one Dastagiri Sahib, who died in the month of February, 1920. Dastagiri was also survived by a son Mohamed Ghouse, and a daughter, Mahaboobi. On the 27th November, 1933, A. Abdul Gafoor obtained a decree against the estate of Dastagiri for the payment of Rs. 8,215-10-8. In execution of that decree he attached the properties with which this suit is concerned. The attachment was objected to by the first defendant on the ground that the properties had been conveyed to him by the second defendant on behalf of herself and her children by two conveyances, one dated the 24th July, 1923 and the other dated the 24th June, 1924. The first defendants objection to the attachment was upheld and as the result, this suit was filed on the 24th July, 1935. The plaintiffs averred that the conveyances to the first defendant were sham transactions and therefore of no legal effect. The Subordinate Judge held that they were supported by consideration and were entered into bona fide.

3. The consideration of the conveyance of the 24th July, 1923, was stated to be Rs. 10,000 of which Rs. 1,250 was paid to the widow in cash and the balance paid in discharge of debts due by Dastagiris estate on a mortgage and a promissory note. The consideration for the conveyance of the 24th June, 1924, was Rs. 7,000, of which Rs. 1,000 was paid in cash to the widow and Rs. 6,000 in discharge of a mortgage debtowing by the estate. The Subordinate Judge was also of the opinion that the first defendant had obtained a title to the properties by adverse possession. Consequently he dismissed the suit.

4. We agree with the Subordinate Judge that the conveyances of the properties in suit to the first defendant were bona fide and that the consideration passed; but this does not mean that the first defendant obtained a complete title to the property. He undoubtedly did obtain a title to the one-eighth share of the second defendant, but he obtained no title to seven-eighths of it, which represented the interests of the son and the daughter. The second defendant was not the lawful guardian of the son and daughter and had no power to sell their interests in the estate. Therefore, so far as the interests of the son and daughter were concerned, the conveyances were entirely inoperative, and the seven-eighths of the property remained the property of the son and daughter and liable for attachment in execution of the decree passed against them.

5. This means that if the first defendant has not been in possession of the property adverse to the son and daughter for a period of twelve years before suit, the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that they have a right to attach seven-eighths of it in execution of their decree. The suit was filed within twelve years of the 24th July, 1923, the date of the first conveyance.

6. It has been decided in this Province that an order of attachment does not interrupt the possession of a person holding adversely to the true owner. This was held in 1901 in Seetharama Reddi v. Venku Reddi (1901) 11 M.L.J. 344 and in 1925 in Ranganalha Iyer v. Srinivasa Iyengar AIR1926Mad42 . In Vasudeo Almaram Joshi v. Eknath Balkrishna Thite I.L.R.(1910) 35 Bom. 79 the Bombay High Court expressed an opinio