The main legal point established is the interpretation of the order for stay and Section 39 of the Code, emphasizing the discretion of the Court in transmission of decree.

Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J.

1. This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor from an order of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai transmitting the decree in O.S. No. 33 of 1927 for execution to the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Tanjore.

2. The appellant raised two contentions in the Court below both of which have, however, been overruled The first was that by reason of an order for stay made by the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai in pursuance of the direction of this Court in C.M.A. No. 403 of 1941, the respondents 1 to 7 were not entitled to execute the decree until the disposal of A.S. No. 243 of 1942 pending in this Court. The latter appeal is from a decision of the same Court in O.S. No. 29 of 1931 in which the appellant was the plaintiff and the respondents 1 to 7 were defendants. By the final decree passed in the lower Court it was found that there was a sum of Rs. 476 payable by the appellant to the respondents 1 to 7. This figure was arrived at after setting off the costs payable to the respondents 1 to 7 against a sum of Rs. 1,000 only found in favour of the appellant. A.S. No. 243 of 1942 which we referred to is an appeal from this decree.

3. The directions contained in the order of this Court in C.M.A. No. 403 of 1941 are couched in the following words:

that the lower Court do pass an order under Rule 29 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code granting stay of execution until the decision of O.S. No. 29 of 1931 on the file of the lower Court.

4. It was in terms of this order that the lower Court has passed its order of stay. On a strict construction of the words used in the order, the appellant cannot argue that the order of stay continues even after disposal of the suit. That order having been made under Order 21, Rule 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure the learned advocate for the appellant argues that a wider operation ought to be given to it. The rule states as follows:

Where a suit is pending in any Court against the holder of a decree of such Court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided.

5. The contention is that the words until the pending suit has been decided really mean until not merely this suit is decided but also until the remedies of the appellant are exhausted by appeals preferred against the decision in the suit. Reliance is placed on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mahesh Chandra Sadhu v. Jogendralal Sarkar (1925) 50 M.L.J. 72 where the words until the pending suit has been decided has been interpreted to mean until the pending suit has been finally decided, the appeal being apparently regarded as a continuation of the suit. According to the learned Judges, the word suit here includes an appeal or appeals from the decision until a finality is reached. But we find that this decision was considered in a later decision of the same Court in Radhaballav Khan v. Pyarilal Ghosh I.L.R.(1890) Mad. 504. In this case the learned Judges emphatically dissented from the view taken in the earlier case and expressed the opinion that if it were necessary they would have referred the correctness of the earlier decision to a Full Bench, but they did not consider it necessary to do so as the order then under consideration was not one expressly made under Rule 29. Apart from these two decisions we have not been referred to any other case directly bearing on the interpretation of the rule under consideration. Mr. Swaminatha Iyer, has, however, referred us to a decision of this Court based upon Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code where the words " pending suit" occur. In Chinnakaruppan Chetti v. Meyyappa Chetti (1915) M.W.N. 844 Seshagiri Ayyar, J., considered that those words meant to include the appellate stages of the suit as an appeal was but a continuation of a suit. We are, however, not prepared to apply this reasoning to the provisions of