The main legal point established in the judgment is that the maintenance liability under the Hindu Law is binding upon the appellant and is exempt from scaling down under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act.

Patanjali Sastri, J.

1. The facts giving rise to this second appeal are simple and not in dispute. One Appanna Dora died in 1906 having executed a will whereby he gave his widow power to adopt. The widow adopted the appellant in 1913 when he was still a minor. The natural father of the appellant acting as his guardian executed a deed of maintenance in favour of Ammanna , the mother of Appanna, on 13th April, 1914, agreeing to pay her maintenance at the rate of seven garces of paddy every year with interest at the rate of two addas per putti per month in case of default of payment on the due date. Ammanna assigned to the respondent herein the arrears of maintenance due for the four years from Promoduta to Sreemukha (both inclusive) under two assignment deeds dated 21st January, 1933, and 24th September, 1934, respectively, whereupon the respondent brought the suit for recovery of the arrears with interest, impleading the appellant who had attained majority as the first defendant and his natural father who executed the maintenance deed and his adoptive mother as defendants 2 and 3 respectively, but praying for a decree only against Appannas estate now in the hands of the appellant. The learned Subordinate Judge of Chicacole who tried the suit decreed the claim, and the decree has been affirmed by the District Judge of Vizagapatam. Hence this second appeal.

2. Only two questions have been argued before us by Mr. Venkatachari for the appellant. He has urged, in the first place, that the contract entered into by the appellants guardian during his minority to pay maintenance at the rate specified in the maintenance deed cannot bind the appellant personally, and that in the absence of a personal liability the decree passed against his properties is unsustainable. This contention is, however, opposed to the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Ramajogayya v. Jagannadham (1918) 36 M.L.J. 29 : I.L.R. Mad. 185 and to several other decisions which have followed that Full Bench ruling, where it has been held that a decree can be passed against a minors estate on a contract entered into on his behalf by his guardian if the estate would have been liable for the obligation incurred by the guardian under the personal law to which he is subject. It is not denied in this case that the appellant is liable under his personal law, i.e., the Hindu Law, to maintain his paternal grandmother Ammanna. The covenant to pay her maintenance entered into by his guardian during his minority is therefore, according to the decisions referred to above, binding upon the appellant and warrants the decree that has been passed by the Courts below. Mr. Venkatachari admitted that this would be the position but for the subsequent decision of the Privy Council in Zamindar of Polavaram v. Maharajah of Pittapur which, he maintained, has superseded these decisions. That was a case where it was found that a mortgage executed by the guardian of a minor was invalid as it was not attested as required by law, but this Court gave a decree against the minors " general assets " on the basis of the guardians covenant to pay contained in the mortgage deed, as it was not disputed for the minor that the guardian entered into the transaction for a purpose which under the Hindu Law would make it binding on the minor--see Zamindar of Polavaram v. Maharajah of Pittapur (1930) 60 M.L.J. 56 : I.L.R. Mad. 163. The learned Judges followed the Full Bench ruling referred to above. The decision of the Privy Council in Zamindar of Polavaram v. Maharajah of Pittapur was given on two consolidated appeals preferred from the decree of this Court made as aforesaid, one by the plaintiff who sought a decree for sale on the footing that the debt was a secured debt and the other by the defendant seeking to have the decree passed against his " general assets " set aside. We are not concerned, for the purposes of this case, with their Lordships decision in the appeal preferred by the plaintiff. A