The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the distinction between 'Appeals' and 'Revision' under the Civil Procedure Code, particularly in relation to the applicability of Section 115 and the appealability of orders.

Patanjali Sastri, J.

1. These are petitions for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from the order made in C.M.A. No. 339 of 1938 and C.R.P. No. 2005 of 1941 whereby the respondent was declared to be an agriculturist entitled to the benefits of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (IV of 1938) and his application for relief under that Act by way of scaling down a decree passed against him was remanded to the lower Court for disposal in the light of the judgment of this Court. The facts giving rise to these proceedings are stated in that judgment and need not be recapitulated here. It will be seen that the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal and the Civil Revision Petition related to the same subject-matter, namely, the scaling down of the decree debt and raised the same questions for determination; and although a preliminary objection was taken to the maintainability of the appeal, it was considered unnecessary to pronounce on the point as the grounds of objection to the decision of the lower Court appeared to be such as would warrant interference by this Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code in the Civil Revision Petition preferred under that section. Arguments in the present proceeding have accordingly proceeded on the footing that the order of this Court from which an appeal is now sought to be preferred to His Majesty in Council is one passed in the revision petition aforesaid.

2. The petitioner seeks a certificate under Sections 109(a) and no or, in the alternative, under Section 109(c) of the Civil Procedure Code. It is not disputed that the case fulfils the requirements of Section 110 as regards the value of the subject-matter. But the respondent contends that Clause (a) is inapplicable because firstly, the order sought to be appealed against is not a "final order" as it has not finally disposed of the rights of parties but has left them to be determined by the lower Court and, secondly, it is not an order passed on appeal" as it must be regarded as one passed in the civil revision petition already referred to. It is unnecessary to consider the first of these objections as we are of opinion that the second is bound to prevail. The Code of Civil Procedure draws a well marked distinction between "Appeals" which are dealt with in Part VII and "Revision" which is dealt with in Part VIII, and Section 115 which empowers the High Court to exercise revisional jurisdiction further emphasises the distinction by providing that this power can be exercised only in cases "in which no appeal lies thereto." It is therefore difficult to see how an order under this section which can only be made when there is no appeal" can be said to be an order "passed on appeal". The term appeal is not defined in the Code and it may, in a comprehensive sense, include a revision petition,. But in the context of the relevant provisions of the Code on which the present issue turns, the termappears to be in the narrower technical sense in contradistinction to "revision". The Allahabad High Court in Suraj Singh v. Phul Kumari I.L.R.(1925) All. 226 and the Patna High Court in Krishna Chandra Deb v. Raja Rajendra Narayan Bhanja Deo I.L.R.(1936) Pat. 659 have also taken the same view. It follows that the order under consideration is not appealable under Section 109(a) even assuming that it was a "final order" within the meaning of that section.

3. Petitioners earned Counsel relied strongly upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Secretary of State for India in Council v. British India Steam Navigation Co. (1911) Cri.L.J. 90 which doubtless supports his contention. The decision was based, mainly, if not wholly, upon the fact that the provisions of the Letters Patent, as they then stood, defining the jurisdiction of the High Court did not refer to revisional jurisdiction as distinct from the appellate jurisdiction. An order made under Section 115 of the Code must, it was therefore considered, be one made in the exercise of appellate juri