The central legal point established in the judgment is that the determination of whether interest should cease to run from the date of payment into Court is based on special circumstances and the decree-holder's means to furnish security.

Mockett, J.

1. The judgment-debtor is the appellant and the decree-holder is the respondent. The amount concerned is Rs. 1,809-1-8. An amount of Rs. 9,681-13-9 was paid into Court in pursuance of an order of the High Court on the 9th August, 1,937. By making that payment the judgment-debtor obtained a stay of execution. It is contended by the appellant-judgment-debtor that from that day, namely, the 9th August, 1937, interest should cease to run in favour of the decree-holder; and if that is so there will be a reduction in the amount now claimed of Rs. 1,809-1-8 being the difference between Rs. 11,981-0-r for which amount the judgment-debtor claimed credit and the sum of Rs. 10,171-14-9 for which he was actually given credit by the decree-holder.

2. The short point before us is this : Does interest cease to run from the date of payment in, as contended by the appellant? There is no specific provision of law on the point. Order 24, Rules 1 to 3 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with payments in satisfaction which imply an admission of liability. In that case it is provided by Rules 2 and 3 that notice should be given to the plaintiff and after notice interest should not run against the defendant. This is clearly a most just provision, because from the moment of. payment in the money virtually becomes the property of the plaintiff, since he will be able to take it out of Court. In this case the money was paid into Court on a petition by the judgment-debtor himself and he thereby obtained the advantage of a stay. The money did not become unconditionally available to the decree-holder. He could not take it out without giving security for it. In such cases it may well be that although it is easy for a judgment-debtor to pay the money into Court, thereby obtaining the advantage of a stay of execution the decree-holder has not the means to give security. The position is that whether interest runs or ceases to run is a matter for a special order. Our attention has not been directed to any decision which suggests that in such a case as this, that is to say, where an order as is commonly made for a stay on terms the decree-holder is only to take the money out on furnishing security, interest should cease to run against the judgment-debtor, and speaking for myself I cannot contemplate that there should be any such general rule. These are matters which must obviously be decided on the special facts. It would appear that an order such as the present appellant seeks is made only under exceptional circumstances. Two cases have been cited. The first is reported in Satyanandam v. Paramkusan A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 342. It is a decision of Walsh and Varadachariar, JJ. In that case, it appeared that a payment was made under Order 24, Rule 2 on the "challenge" of the plaintiffs and in their presence, and it was held that that being so no separate notice was necessary and the plaintiff could not claim interest from the date of such deposit until he received a formal notice. It will be observed that there was a payment under Order 24, Rule 2, which has, in my opinion, no relation to the case before us. But if it is of any assistance, this can be derived, namely, that when the payment is made at the instance of the decree-holder himself it may be right that the defendant should not suffer from further calculation of interest from the day that he paid it into Court at the decree-holders instance. The second decision is reported in South Indian Railway Co. v. Mayilvahanan AIR1943Mad334 . In that case there was a decree against the South Indian Railway Company and the Company obtained a stay of execution. There was an interim stay on the Company depositing the amount into Court. With regard to part of the sum with which the case was concerned, the plaintiff was given leave to draw it on furnishing security. He was a minor, and that being so, the Court was bound under the provision of Order 32, Rule 6 to direct that security should be given by his guardi