IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
King, J.
Kondepu Raghavayya
Versus
Elukooru Vasudevayya Chetty
Decided On : 30.08.1943
Jurisdiction - Contract Act - Limitation Act - Section 23 of the Contract Act, Section 14 of the Limitation Act - The court discussed the jurisdiction issue based on the terms of the contracts, the applicability of Section 23 of the Contract Act, and the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The court also considered the good faith of the appellant in prosecuting the suit and the relevance of the advocate's good faith in the legal proceedings.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a merchant, filed a suit for damages against the respondent for breach of contracts. The jurisdiction of the court, the issue of limitation, and the appellant's good faith in prosecuting the suit were the key aspects of the case.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the appellant's suit was dismissed due to the jurisdiction issue and the bar of limitation. The court also held that the appellant failed to establish his good faith in prosecuting the suit.
Issues: Jurisdiction, Limitation, Good faith of the appellant
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the lack of jurisdiction, the bar of limitation, and the failure to establish the appellant's good faith in prosecuting the suit.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with costs.
King, J.
1. The appellant is a merchant living in Bezwada. In September, 1935, he entered into two contracts with the respondent, a merchant of Nandyal: In April, 1936, appellant, alleging that the contracts had been broken by the respondent, filed a suit for damages against him in the Court of the District Munsiff of Bezwada. In his written statement respondent pleaded, amongst other contentions, that one of the terms of the contracts themselves was that all suits arising out of them should be filed only in Nandyal, and therefore the Bezwada Court had no jurisdiction. In reply to this contention a further sub-paragraph was inserted in the plaint in March, 1937, in which it was stated that the term relied upon by the respondent offended against Section 23 of the Contract Act. The District Munsiff of Bezwada held that he had no jurisdiction to try the suit and returned the plaint. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge of Bezwada confirmed this decision.
2. Appellant thereupon presented the plaint in the Court of the District Munsiff of Nandyal on 10th January, 1940. Respondent pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. Both the learned District Munsiff and the learned Subordinate Judge of Kurnel have accepted this view and dismissed the suit. Hence the present second appeal.
3. The question of limitation depends upon whether the appellant can or cannot take advantage of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. If he can, even to the extent of excluding only the period spent in the trial of the suit by the District Munsiff, Bezwada, his suit in Nandyal will be in time. If he cannot, it is clearly barred. The question which must therefore be decided is whether the appellant in prosecuting his suit in Bezwada was acting in good faith, i.e., with due care and attention.
4. In support of his plea of good faith appellant relied upon two facts:
(i) He was unaware of the term in the contracts which required him to file his suit in Nandyal; and
(ii) He filed it in Bezwada upon the advice of his advocate, whom he naturally trusted to decide such a question of law for him.
5. The lower Appellate Court has held against the first contention on the ground that appellant did not dare to assert it in the witness-box. On the second contention it has held that the advocate himself did not act in good faith, and therefore appellant cannot rely upon his advice as establishing his own good faith. It is. on this second contention that the arguments in second appeal have turned.
6. The decision of the learned Subordinate Judge against the good faith of the advocate is clearly one of fact and it has not, and cannot, be urged that that decision is open to attack in second appeal as one based upon no evidence, for the advocate has himself given evidence on behalf of the appellant. In the course of that evidence he said that in his opinion Section 23 of the Contract Act rendered the particular term in the contracts unenforceable. He did not look up any authorities to satisfy himself on this point, as he regarded his opinion to be as completely free from doubt as the proposition that a son is heir to his father.
7. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that there are rulings of the Lahore Court which support his view and that he may therefore have honestly held it. On the other hand there is a ruling of this High Court (by Madhavan Nair, J., in Achratlal Kesavlal Mehta and Co. v. Vijayam and Co. AIR1925Mad1145 which holds that under Section 28 of the Contract Act, a section which clearly applies far more directly than Section 23 to facts of the kind with which we have now to deal, such a clause in a contract is not illegal. This ruling has been followed by other High Courts, e.g., Calcutta, Bombay and Allahabad, and, so far as I am aware, has never been dissented from. The learned Subordinate Judge points out that the least research would have acquainted the advocate with this state of the law in Madras.
8. I do not think it is open to me to f
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.