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1943 Supreme(Mad) 66

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Kuppuswami Aiyar, J.
M. Venkatarama Ayyar
Versus
A. Rangaswamy Ayyar
Decided On : 25.02.1943

The main legal point established in the judgment is the preservation of the plaintiff's right to the pathway under the Indian Easements Act, and the concept of substantial damage justifying the grant of a mandatory injunction.

Headnote:

Easement - Dispute over Right of Way - Easements Act - [Indian Easements Act, 1882, Section 13, 15, 17, 22] - The court discussed the provisions of the Indian Easements Act, particularly sections 13, 15, 17, and 22, and their application to the dispute over the right of way. The court emphasized that the servient owner cannot substitute a new pathway in place of the old one and highlighted the strict rights of the dominant owner under the Act. The court also considered the concept of substantial damage justifying the grant of a mandatory injunction.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff filed a suit for an injunction directing the defendant to remove a motor shed and a latrine in a portion of the land set apart for use as a common road. The defendant contended that he was not bound to remove the buildings as there was no road in the adjacent plots to which this road could lead.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the plaintiff's right to the pathway was preserved, and the defendant was liable to permit the southern portion of his plot set apart for the purpose of a road. The court also held that the plaintiff would be entitled to have the motor shed and the latrine removed as soon as a pathway was opened in the adjacent plot or the obstruction was removed.

Issues: The issues involved the defendant's obligation to remove the buildings and the plaintiff's entitlement to a mandatory injunction.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the servient owner cannot substitute a new pathway in place of the old one under the Easements Act. It also considered the concept of substantial damage justifying the grant of a mandatory injunction.

Final Decision: The court confirmed the lower appellate court's decree with a modification, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

JUDGMENT

Kuppuswami Aiyar, J.

1. Defendant is the appellant and this second appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff for an injunction directing the defendant to remove a motor shed and a latrine in a portion of the land belonging to the defendant set apart for use as a common road. The property in dispute is situated in Kodaikanal. The plaintiff, the defendants father and four others owned six adjacent plots in that area. They are marked as plot Nos. 1,2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in Ex. D. plaintiff is the owner of the plot marked 2 and the defendants father was the owner of plot marked 3. The plan attached to Ex "E" is a plan of plots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and a portion of plot No. 4 in which the portion in dispute is marked out. The original understanding was that all these six owners should have access to both Bear Shola Road and to Vilpatti Road to the north-east of these plots and it was agreed that a road leaving from Bear Shola Road to Vilpatti Road should be laid through these six plots. The plaintiffs case was that the plot marked "STQA" in his plot and that marked "AQYJ" in plot No. 3 which belonged to the defendants father as shown in the plan attached to Ex. E were to form portions of the road agreed to be laid connecting Bear Shola Road with the Vilpatti Road. The owners of plots Nos. 4, 5 and 6 were able to get, by making other purchases, access to Vilpatti Road and therefore they did not reserve in their plots the requisite portion of the road that was to connect Bear Shola Road with Vilpatti Road. Consequently the plaintiff also thought that his portion of the road need not be set apart and that he could use it as part of his compound. But the defendant was not able to have access from any road to his plot No. 3 and so he removed the obstruction placed by the plaintiff at the place marked " AQ. The plaintiff thereupon filed a suit, O.S. No. 3 of 1935 for an injunction restraining the defendant from using the portion of his land marked "STQA" for going to his plot No. 3 and for directing him to replace the obstruction removed by him. His case was that he was not bound to allow the defendant to make use of that piece of land as a road inasmuch as the defendant as heir of his father had not kept his part of the contract by keeping the portion marked "AQYJ" as a road. He had already built thereon a motor shed and a latrine--the two buildings which are in this litigation sought to be removed. During the course of the trial in O.S. No. 3,of 1935 the defendant stated that he had always been willing to keep the contract and that he was prepared either to remove the motor shed and latrine or to set aside apart a sufficiently wide portion of the land to the north of the motor shed to enable the plaintiff to pass to any road which might be opened in plots 4, 5 and 6 for the purposes of having an access to Vilpatti road. The first Court dismissed the suit, but on appeal the learned Subordinate Judge modified the decree by adding a declaration that the defendant therein was liable to permit the southern portion of his plot No. 3 set apart under Ex. I and D therein for the purpose of a road. Though the defendant during the course of the trial offered to remove the motor shed and the latrine, he did not do so. Hence this suit for removal of the two buildings. The defendant contended that he was not bound to remove them as there was no road in plots Nos. 4, 5 or 6 to which this road could lead and that therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction claimed. He also stated that he had always been willing to allot enough space in his plot to connect the plaintiffs plot "STQA" with the pathway in plot No. 4 if the plaintiff succeeded in getting a common pathway open in plots Nos. 4 5 and 6. The first Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation as there was no fresh cause of action. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge of Dindigul decreed the suit with costs giving two months time to the de




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