The main legal point established in the judgment is the strict construction of the provisions of the Limitation Act, specifically Sections 14 and 15, and their inapplicability to certain scenarios, ultimately influencing the court's decision in the case.

Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.

1. The suit which has given rise to this appeal was filed by the appellant under Section 73(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. The suit was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge on the ground that the claims of the contesting defendants for rateable distribution were not barred by the law of limitation as the plaintiff had contended The plaintiff says that the Subordinate Judge here erred and should have granted the decree sought. The question is one of considerable importance and there are no reported decisions which are directly in point, although there are authorities which have bearing.

2. In O.S. No. 34 of 1932 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai, the plaintiff obtained a decree against the estate of one P.L.T.A.R. Arunachalam Chettiar for the payment of the sum of Rs. 7,810-8-4. Arunachalam Chettiar was joint with his son, who was sued as the legal representative of his father. On the 20th October, 1932, another creditor of the estate, Ramaswami Chettiar, filed O.S. No. 397 of 1932 in the Court of the District Munsiff of Devakottai for the administration of the estate of P.L.T.A.R. Arunachalam Chettiar. Several creditors were impleaded as defendants. The plaintiff was the 22nd defendant, and the first, second and third defendants in the present suit were made the fifth, sixth and sixteenth defendants respectively. All these defendants had obtained decrees against the estate of Arunachalam, The plaintiff and the first, second and third defendants contended that a suit for the administration of the estate of Arunachalam did not lie, because he had left no separate property and his son had obtained an absolute interest in the joint family property by survivorship. This contention was rejected by the District Munsiff, who on the 28th April, 1934, passed a preliminary decree for administration. His decision was upheld by the Subordinate Judge on first appeal and by this Court on second appeal. In a further appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the contention was, however, accepted and consequently, on the 10th April, 1939, the District Munsiff passed a formal decree dismissing the suit.

3. After the District Munsiff had passed a preliminary decree for administration, he appointed a receiver to take charge of the properties forming the estate, and in accordance with the duties which had devolved upon him, the receiver took steps to realise the assets. As the result, he brought into Court the sum of Rs. 11,425-6-6. The plaintiff had taken the precaution of keeping alive the decree which he had obtained in O.S. No. 34 of 1932, and on the 4th March, 1939, he applied for the attachment of the Rs. 11,425-6-6. The amount due to him under his decree had then increased by reason of interest to Rs. 11,904-14-0. The first, second and third defendants allowed their decrees to become time barred. Nevertheless, on the 28th March, 1939, the first defendant applied for the attachment of the money in Court, and on the 26th April, 1939, and 6th July, 1939, the second and third defendants made similar applications respectively.

4. The question then arose whether the defendants were entitled to rateable distribution of the Rs. 11,425-6-6 with the plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge held that they were. In his opinion, the period which elapsed between the institution of the administration suit on the 20th October, 1932 and its dismissal on the 10th April, 1989, should not be taken into consideration in calculating whether the application of the first, second and third defendants were in time. As the Subordinate Judge had held that these defendants were entitled to share in the fund in Court, the plaintiff filed the present suit under Section 73(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Subordinate Judge adhered to the opinion expressed in the attachment proceedings and passed a decree dismissing the suit. The respondents in the appeal are the first second and third defendants in this suit.

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