The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the rule of contemporanea expositio and the consideration of evidence of possession during the period immediately following the execution of the deed to interpret the intention of the parties and ascertain the true meaning of the grant.

Patanjali Sastri, J.

1. The question raised in this appeal relates to the true construction of what has been called a " release deed " executed on the 6th of May, 1890, by one Sundarapandiya Naicker and Kamalu Ammal, the widow of the previous zamindar of Bodinaickanur. The appellants are the successors in title of Sundarapandiya Naicker and the first respondent (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) is the present zamindar of Bodinaickanur. The question is whether a property known as Mallingaswami Hill comprising hill and forest tracts of 1,500 acres in 6xtent passed to Sundarapandiya Naicker under the release deed which is marked as Ex. XLVIII in the case. The facts which led to the execution of this document may be briefly stated The previous zamindar of Bodinaickanur died in 1888 and disputes arose regarding succession to the zamindari between his widow Kamalu Ammal, the respondents father who claimed the estate as the undivided coparcener of the late zamindar and Sundarapandiya Naicker who claimed it as his Uncle. The disputes were eventually compromised and Ex. XLVIII embodies the terms settled between Sundarapandiya and Kamalii. The terms of the settlement between Kamalu and the respondents father are not material for the purpose of this appeal and need no mention here. The result of the settlement under Ex. XLVIII so far as it is material for the present dispute was that one of the twelve villages comprised in the zamindari of Bodinaicka-nur called Dombucheri was given to Sundarapandiya with full and absolute rights and the remaining eleven villages were taken by Kamalu, each party giving up and releasing all his or her rights in respect of the properties allotted to the other. The first column of the schedule attached to the deed indicated the properties which were to be enjoyed by Kamalu and the second column thereof contained a description of Dombucheri village assigned to Sundarapandiya Naicker under the compromise. Kamalu died in January, 1921 and the respondent herein succeeded to the zamindari. Nearly twelve years thereafter when the period of limitation was about to expire, he brought the suit out of which this appeal arises for recovery of Mallingaswami Hill alleging that it did not pass to Sundarapandiya under Ex. XLVIII and the appellants were in unlawful possessiono thereof.

2. Both the Courts below have found that Mallingaswami Hill was no parcel of the grant to Sundarapandiya and accordingly decreed the suit. A plea of title by adverse possession appears to have been raised in the trial Court and the learned Subordinate Judge had to investigate the question of possession elaborately and record findings upon it. Though this plea was given up in appeal as it was obviously untenable the suit having been brought within twelve years of the widows death, the investigation and findings as to possession of the disputed property have a material bearing, for reasons which will be presently indicated, on the question for determination in this appeal, namely, whether Mallingaswami Hill was parcel of the grant under Ex. XLVIII on a true construction of that deed.

3. Before considering this question, I will mention, only to dismiss, the suggestion of Mr. Govindarajachari, the earned Counsel for the respondent, that this Court cannot interfere in second appeal with the concurrent findings of the Courts below on the question of parcel or no parcel as it is one of fact and not of law according to Jessell, M.R., in Francis v. Hayward (1882) 22 Ch.D. 177 . It may be so in one sense, but it does not follow that, when its determination depends on the true construction of a deed, this Court is precluded from considering it even under the limitations imposed by Section 100, Civil Procedure Code. As observed by Lord Wensleydale in Waterpark v. Fennell (1859) 7 H.L.C. 649 : 11 E.R. 259:

Whether parcel or not is often said, but not with strict propriety, to be a question for the jury. I apprehend that the true rule is perf