Leach, C.J.

1. In view of the decision of the Privy Council in I.L.R. (1939) 2 Cal. 300, l the answer to the first question must be in the negative. Their Lordships there held that an order of the Court appointing managers of an estate, the order being made in accordance with an agreement entered into between the parties, did not bring the case within the section. In the present case the order appointing M. Gulam Dastagir Sahib and Hajee K. Gulam Khader Sahib as managing agents was passed at the request of the parties. Mr. P.R. Srinivasan has suggested that this case is distinguishable from Kesher Deo v. I.T. Commr., Bengal because here one of the parties is a minor. The fact that the law requires the Court to give leave to a guardian to enter into a compromise on behalf of a minor does not alter the position. All- that the Court does in such a case is to see that the proposed compromise is in the interests of the minor. An order passed on the terms agreed upon will still remain an agreement between the parties and not an order of the Court within the contemplation of Section 41. As we have answered the first question in the negative, the second question does not arise. The