IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J.
In Re: Ghosh Beevi
Versus
Decided On : 25.02.1944
Court-fee - Valuation of suit for court-fee and jurisdiction - Section 7, Clause (iv) (d), Court-fees Act, read with Section 8, Suits Valuation Act - Section 9, Suits Valuation Act - Daivanayaga v. Renukambal A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 977 - Muthusami v. Muthu Chidambara M.H.C.R. 356 - Dhirta v. Kesri 3 IND.CAS. 484
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff filed a suit for a permanent injunction, valued at Rs. 100, which resulted in a reversal of the decree by the District Court. A notification was issued by the High Court, altering the method of valuation for court-fee and jurisdiction for suits of this nature.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the notification altering the method of valuation for court-fee and jurisdiction applied to the appeal, and the court-fee payable for the memorandum of second appeal must be calculated and paid in accordance with the new notification.
Issues: The main issue was whether the plaintiff-appellant was entitled to pay the same court-fee on the second appeal as originally paid when filing the suit, or whether a fee determinable according to the method indicated by the new notification should be paid.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the decision in Daivanayaga v. Renukambal A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 977 and the principle that the value of the subject-matter for the purpose of fixing the forum remains the same throughout and is not altered by a change in a fiscal enactment.
Final Decision: The court held that the notification altering the method of valuation for court-fee and jurisdiction applied to the appeal, and the court-fee payable for the memorandum of second appeal must be calculated and paid in the manner laid down in the notification.
Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J.
1. The matter comes before me on a reference made by the Taxing Officer. The suit out of which the present second appeal has been sought to be preferred was instituted on 13th December 1941 for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from trespassing on land alleged to be in the lawful possession of the plaintiff as a usufructuary mortgagee. The plaintiff valued the suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction on her own valuation at Rs. 100, a course which was open to her under Section 7, Clause (iv) (d), Court-fees Act, read with Section 8, Suits Valuation Act. A decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff and thereupon defendant 1 appealed to the District Court. The appeal was disposed of on 4th October 1943 and it resulted in a reversal of the decree passed by the District Munsif. The plaintiff is now endeavouring to file a second appeal and she filed her memorandum in this Court on 3rd January 1944. Between the date when the District Court passed its decree and the date when the second appeal was filed here, a notification has been issued by the High Court under Section 9, Suits Valuation Act, with the previous sanction of the Provincial Government directing a change in the method by which the subject-matter of a suit of the character here in question is to be valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction. The notification amongst others states:
In suits for injunction, where relief is sought with reference to any Immovable property, on the ground that the defendant denies the title of the plaintiff to the property and disturbs or threatens to disturb the plaintiffs possession thereof, the value of the subject-matter of the suit shall not be less than half the value of the property calculated in the manner provided in Section 7, para. 5, Court-fees Act, 1870.
The intention behind the notification is to take away from the plaintiff or the appellant as the case may be the right he had under Section 7 (iv) (d) to value a suit of this kind at his discretion at any amount he likes. This notification came into force on 1st November 1943 more than two months before the second appeal was filed. The question is whether the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to pay the same court-fee on his memorandum of second appeal as he originally paid when he filed the suit or whether he should pay a fee determinable according to the method indicated by the new notification. Mr. R. Kesava Aiyengar, the learned advocate for the appellant, has contended that the value which was correctly fixed when the suit was instituted according to the law then in force continues to apply to the appeal and second appeal, in spite of alterations subsequently made. For this contention he relies on the decision of the Full Bench in Daivanayaga v. Renukambal A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 977. It is clear from the judgment of the Full Bench that the Court was then called upon to decide whether an amendment of the law made after the institution of the suit affected the right of appeal which the parties possessed as matters stood at the date of the suit. The Full Bench held that an amendment which came into force after the institution of the suit would not deprive the plaintiff of his right of appeal to the Court to which appeals lay at the date of the suit. There was no question raised there as to whether the alteration made in the court-fee payable applied to the appeal or not. If we look at the ground of the decision it seems clear that it proceeded on the well-known principle of law that the moment a suit is filed the plaintiff has a vested right of appeal to a particular tribunal which cannot be taken away by a subsequent enactment. This, of course, does not touch the question of court-fee in regard to which it is not possible to maintain that there is such a vested right. Strong reliance is placed upon the following passage occurring at p. 865 of the report, namely:
Presumably the value of the subject-matter of the suit is
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