The judgment emphasized the distinction between direct and collateral attacks on a decree, and clarified that an erroneous decision by a Court of competent jurisdiction is not open to collateral attack.

Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J.

1. This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the appellant for partition and recovery of a share of the property left by her deceased husband Thangavelu Pillai by virtue of the provisions of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937. This. Act became law on 14th April 1937, when it received the assent of the Governor-General. Before the Act, a widow had no right to a share in any part of her husbands property, if the husband died as a member of a coparcenary or had left a son or sons surviving. For the first time the Act gave her such a right. Thangavelu Pillai who died on 28th June 1939, had married three wives in succession. The appellant is the second of his wives. Her two co-widows are Ammakannu Ammal and Dhanabagiammal, impleaded as defendants 1 and 2 in the suit. His only son, Kanakasabapathi still a minor, by his third wife Dhanabagiammal was joined as defendant 3. It is common ground that the estate left by Thangavelu Pillai comprised amongst others, agricultural lands. Under the Act, the appellant is entitled to a one-sixth share in the divisible properties. No question arises about the quantum of the share; the only question is, what are the properties liable for division in the suit?

2. The suit was instituted on 5th July 1939, more than two years after the enactment of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937. In her plaint the appellant claimed a share in all the assets left by Thangavelu Pillai, including the agricultural lands. Neither in the written statements filed by the defendants nor in the issues framed for trial was objection taken to the demand for a share in such lands on the ground that the Act did not apply to agricultural lands. It was not pleaded that so far as such lands are concerned her claim should be determined by the ordinary Hindu law and not by the Act. The result was that when the Subordinate Judge came to pass the preliminary decree on 31st July 1940, he declared the right of the appellant to a share in all the properties in suit including the agricultural lands and directed the appointment of a commissioner for effecting a division by metes and bounds. In pursuance of the preliminary decree the plaintiff applied on 2nd October 1940, for the appointment of a commissioner for effecting the division, and for the passing of the final decree. Accordingly on 30th October 1940, the Court appointed a commissioner for effecting the division of the properties, and he made his report on 14th April 1941, submitting a scheme for the division of the immovable properties which consisted of house property of the value of Rupees 22,000 and agricultural lands of the value of Rs. 14,280. It is obvious that up to this point of time, the parties, as well as the Court and the commissioner all proceeded on the assumption that the Act applied to every species of property in a Governors province, without exception and that the plaintiff was entitled to a share in the entirety of her husbands estate. It would seem that just at this time, the question whether the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937 (Central Act 18 of 1937), and the Hindu Womens Rights to Property (Amendment) Act, 1938 (Central Act 11 of 1938), operated to regulate succession to agricultural land, a subject which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Provincial Legislature by reason of Entry No. 21, Part II of Schedule 7, Government of India Act, 1935, was pending decision in the Federal Court. On 22nd April 1941, that Court pronounced its judgment declaring that the Acts in question do not operate to regulate succession to agricultural land in the Governors provinces. It was after the publication of this decision that the contesting defendants, namely, defendants 2 and 3, woke up to discover that the appellant was not entitled under the provisions of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, to claim a share in agricultural lands and they accordingly took the point in their objections