The main legal point established in the judgment is the determination of whether certain property is moveable or immovable, based on the degree and nature of attachment, the purpose of annexation, and the intention of the parties involved.

Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J.

1. The appellant in this appeal was defendant 5 in the suit out of which it has arisen. He is the assignee of a mortgage decree obtained by defendant 3 on a mortgage executed on 6th July 1934 by defendants 1 and 2 over the property known as the South India Bone Mills at Samalkot. The property comprised land as well as the plant and machinery installed thereon for the manufacture of bone meal. The mortgagors were the owners of three other mills also with which however we are not concerned in this appeal. Prior to the execution of the mortgage aforesaid, the mortgagors had on 16th November 1933 entered into an agreement with plaintiffs 2 to 4 who were carrying on a business under the name of the Northern Circars Fibre Trading Company, Coconada , which was plaintiff 1 in the suit. By this agreement defendant 2 who was doing business in the name of C. Raju, Import and Export Company, Coconada, impleaded as defendant 1 to the suit, entrusted the management of his several mills to plaintiff 1 for a period of two years. The Northern Circars Fibre Trading Company, who were thus entrusted with the management, undertook amongst others to invest a sum of Rs. 25,000 in cash in the business and this amount was to carry interest at 12 per cent. per annum. They were referred to in the agreement as the dubashees. It was a term of the agreement that "the monies invested by the dubashees shall be a first charge on the assets of the firm." The plaintiffs instituted the suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 66,746-9-9 as due to them in respect of the moneys invested by them in the business together with interest and the commission earned by them. They also claimed to be entitled to a first charge on the machinery in the mills, the stock-in-trade and the goodwill of the business. The agreement of 16th November 1933 had not been registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, but the plaintiffs claimed that the provisions of the agreement relating to the charge were nonetheless effective in so far as the moveables , viz., the plant and machinery and the stock-in-trade were concerned.

2. Subsequent to the institution of the suit a compromise was arrived at between the plaintiffs and defendants 1 and 2 by which these defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 a sum of Rs. 35,000 in full satisfaction of the claim in suit. Defendants 3 and 4 who were not parties to the compromise contended that the dubashee agreement in so far as it purported to give the plaintiffs a charge over the plant and machinery in the South India Bone Mills at Samalkot was invalid for want of registration because the said plant and machinery were immovable property. The suit was first tried in July 1937 by Mr. Bhaskara Reddi , the then Subordinate Judge who pronounced judgment on 19th July 1937 dismissing the suit on the ground that though the agreement purported to create a charge over moveables as well as immovable properties it was invalid for want of registration not only in respect of the immovable properties but also in respect of the moveable properties because the two sets of properties were inseparable from one another and the charge therefore failed in its entirety. The plaintiffs appealed to this Court in A. S. No. 320 of 1937. The judgment of. the Subordinate Judge was reversed and the case was sent back for rehearing, this Court holding that it is possible to separate the moveable and immovable assets and the charge should be regarded as valid in so far as the moveables were concerned. The ease then came up before Mr. R. M. V. S. Rao for fresh trial and he pronounced his judgment on 23rd December 1941 decreeing the suit in so far as the plant and machinery installed in the mill were concerned on the ground that they constituted moveable and not immovable property. Defendant 5 who, as we have said, is the assignee of the mortgage decree obtained by defendant 3, has preferred this appeal.

3. The only question raised in the