The main legal point established in the judgment is that a suit for a declaratory decree will not lie when the plaintiff is neither entitled to any legal character nor to any right in the suit property.

Mockett, Offg. C.J.

1. In these connected appeals respondent 1 filed a suit O.S. No. 109 of 1941 against Elayaperumal Naicker as defendant 1, his wife Rule Balammal as defendant 2 and his daughter Krishnaveni Ammal, as defendant 4. There was also a claim against one Nataraja Pillai, defendant 4, Defendant 1s clerk relating to the transfer of a motor-car. Defendants 2 and 8 appeal and so far as they are concerned the form of the suit was for a declaration that certain alienations made in favour of the wife and daughter respectively were benami in nature for the purpose of defrauding Defendant 1s creditors. The learned trial Judge, Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff and defendant 3 appeals in Order S.A. No. 79 of 1942 and defendant 2 in Order S.A. No. 8 of 1943. The form of the plaint, and this is made clear by the prayer, is for a declaration that the properties transferred to the appellants were benami in nature. Paragraph 5 states that the transactions are benami and fictitious. This means that the plaintiff alleges not that there was an actual transfer to the defendants but that there was only a transfer in form, the actual property remaining with the transferor. The learned Judge has so found. Accordingly the learned Judge held that Section 53, T.P. Act, had no application, it not being a transfer binding between the parties. It was therefore not void able at the instance of the creditor. The plaint, however, as already stated, proceeds on the basis that there was no real transaction, the transfers being benami, that is to say, in the name of the wife and the daughter, but the property actually remaining with the husband.

2. The appellants have contended before us that following upon this finding the learned Judge should have dismissed the suit and that Section 42, Specific Belief Act, could not be called in aid by the respondent in the absence of facts attracting the provisions of Order 21, Rule 68, Civil P.C. The appellants argued that for these reasons the suit could not be regarded as a declaratory suit. It is not suggested that any claim or objection had arisen for investigation within the meaning of Rule 63. The learned Judge, however, held that Section 42 was not exhaustive and that the suit although not within Section 53, T.P. Act, would lie apart from the provisions of Section 42, Specific Belief Act. That the provisions of Section 42 are not exhaustive is well established by authority: Robert Fischer v. Secretary of State (1904) 22 Mad. 270, Ramachandra Rao v. Secy, of State A.I.R. R. 1916 Mad. 1061 and Secretary of State v. Subbarao A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 618. In each of those cases on the facts the defendants had challenged a substantive right of the plaintiff. In Robert Fischer v. Secretary of State (1904) 22 Mad. 270 the plaintiff prayed for a declaration that an order of the Government to his prejudice be declared invalid. In Ramachandra Rao v. Secy, of State A.I.R.1916 Mad. 1061 a suit for a declaration, that an order debarring one from acting as vakil for another in a village Court was void, was held to be maintainable, though not covered by Section 42, Specific Belief Act. In the latest Madras decision, Secretary of State v. Subbarao A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 618 Beasley C. J. and Bardswell J. held that a suit by a karnam for a declaration, that an order of the Board of Revenue was invalid as being to his prejudice, was maintainable although not comprehended by Section 42, Specific Belief Act. At p. 755 Bardswell J. discusses the question as to what extent Section 42 is not exhaustive of declaratory suits and he refers to the decision of the Privy Council in Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramanadan Prasad Singh A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 78 of the Privy Council case Sir Lawrence Jenkins makes the following observations regarding Section 42:

A plaintiff coming under this section, must, therefore, be entitled to a legal character or to a right as to property. Can these plaintiffs predicate this of themse