The central legal point established in the judgment is the importance of imp leading parties in suits and execution proceedings, and the limited application of the doctrine of lis pendens to involuntary alienation in execution of a mortgage decree.

King, J.

1. These appeals are concerned with a village in the Salem district called Chettihalli. The mittadar, or owner of the melwaram right in this village was one Ramakrishna Chettiar (to be referred to hereinafter as the mortgagor). He mortgaged his rights in this and other villages to the plaintiff in O.S. No. 33 of 1940, District Munsifs Court, Dharmapuri from which the present appeals have arisen. This was so long ago as 1921, 1922 and 1923, and was effected by three mortgage deeds. Defendants 1 to 3 in O.S. No. 33 of 1940 are inamdars of Chettihalli whose right consisted in receiving every year from the mittadar one-third of the sum payable by the mittadar to Government as peshkush. Attached to this right is a first charge on the mittadars interests in the village. On 30th June 1933, the defendants sued the mortgagor for arrears of this payment of one-third of the peshkush, and for the enforcement of their charge. They obtained a decree on 10th April 1934, brought the mortgagors property to sale on 24th October 1934, and obtained delivery in execution of their decree on 4th December 1934. To this suit the plaintiff, who, by virtue of defendants prior charge, may now be called the puisne mortgagee, was not made a party. On 12th October 1933 plaintiff sued the mortgagor on the three mortgages. He obtained a decree on 25th July 1934, sold the mortgagors property on 3rd October 1935 and obtained confirmation of his sale on 6th March 1936. In that suit plaintiff did not imp lead the defendants. Plaintiff next sought to obtain delivery of the property which he had purchased. Defendants naturally obstructed him. An application by plaintiff to remove the obstruction was dismissed on 18th Augustl938. The result wan the present suit by plaintiff filed in August 1939 though now numbered as O.S. No. 33 of 1940, to set aside the adverse order. The suit was dismissed by the learned District Munsif of Dharmapuri. Plaintiffs appeal against this decree dismissing his suit was hoard by the learned Subordinate Judge of Salem who on 12th January 1943 passed an order of remand against which both parties have now appealed.

2. The learned Subordinate Judges findings were these: (i) Plaintiff must pay to defendants the amount due on their decree, (ii) In calculating this amount, plaintiff will have to pay interest, but defendants must give credit for income received by them from the village while they were in possession of it. (iii) Defendants must pay to plaintiff the proportionate amount due to him on his decree for this particular village, (iv) These sums will be set off one against the other, and the exact amount thus found to be due by the defendants will be declared, (v) If defendants do not pay, the property will be sold, and directions are given for the distribution of the sale proceeds. (It follows from this that if defendants do pay, their possession will not be disturbed, and their ownership will be recognized.) (vi) The suit was remanded] for an enquiry into the precise amount thus to be declared payable by the defendants, and for the passing of a decree on the lines indicated by the learned Subordinate Judge. Both parties have appealed from this order of remand. The principal appeal is that of the plaintiff (A.A.O. No. 420). He contends that he has the better title to the property concerned, and that defendants have no right to redeem him. Defendants in C.M.A. No. 458 contend that plaintiff cannot redeem them, so that their title is unassailable and plaintiffs suit should be forthwith dismissed. There was also a contention (not, however, formulated in the grounds of appeal) that defendants need not give credit for the income which they had received.

3. Plaintiffs case regarding the superiority of his own title was put very simply as follows, and depends on the provisions of Order 34, Civil P.C. Defendants ought to have imp leaded him in their suit of 1933 (see Rule 1 of that Order) and not having done so the decree which th