The main legal point established in the judgment is the determination of liability under the Indian Limitation Act XV of 1877 and the Indian Contract Act IX of 1872 in the context of recovery of debts and the liability of sons under Hindu Law.

1. The suit was instituted by the plaintiff as trustee of a temple for recovery of a certain sum of money which represented the rents due to the temple uncollected by the father of the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, who was the preceding trustee.

2. The father having died in August-September 1901, the sons were impleaded as liable as well as the representatives of certain sureties for the proper management of the temple affairs by the father. The suit has been dismissed as barred by limitation. As regards the sons, Article 98 of the Indian Limitation Act XV of 1877 is sought to be made applicable. It runs as follows:

To make good out of the general estate of a deceased trustee the loss occasioned by a breach of trust.

3. The property that is sought to be made liable being the joint family property of the father and sons, which passes by survivorship to the sons on the death of the father, we do not think it forms "the general estate" of the deceased trustee within the meaning of the article. The sons are sued on the ground of the peculiar liability of the sons under the Hindu Law to pay the fathers debts. It is unnecessary to determine which article applies in the case of a suit to enforce the liability of the sons to pay the debts of the father. [See however, Periaswami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar 27 M. k 243. For, the sons are clearly not liable to pay a debt of the father which was barred against him. The suit is based on the ground that the rents Were lost to the temple because the father had allowed them to be barred ; otherwise there would be no liability at all of the father, or his sons. The suit against the father being barred under Article 36 of the Indian Limitation Act XV of 1877 [See Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Municipal Council of Karur 22 M.j 342 no suit can lie against the sons.

4. The next question is--are the sureties liable ? The determination of this question depends upon the construction of Section 134 and Section 137 of the Indian Contract Act IX of 1872. Section 134 says : The surety is discharged by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which is the discharge of the principal debtor." Does the omission of the creditor to sue the principal debtor within the statutory period discharge the surety? We think not. Says Lindley, L.J. in Carter v. White (1883) 25 Ch. D 666 "Is it the law that a creditor who neglects to sue his debtor till the statute has run Will thereby discharge his surety ? There is no decision to that effect. On the contrary the true principle is that mere omission to sue does not discharge the surety, because the surety can himself set the law in operation against the debtor." Cotton L.J., expressed himself to the same effect, and Fry, L.J. concurred. This statement of the law has been accepted without question. See Chifty on Contracts, page 465, 14th Edition, and Darby and Bosanquet on Limitation, 2nd Edition, page 17. Does the Law in India make any difference on this question ? Does the running of the statutory period of time extinguish the debt as well as bar the remedy ? Mr. Mitra in his Tagore Law Lectures on Limitation, 4th Edition, says, at page 14: "As to rights in personam it has been held that a right to receive payment of a debt does subsist even after the remedy by action has been barred." The decisions in Mohesh Lal v. Busunt Kumaree 7 C L.R. 121 and Anando Kishore Dass Bakshi v. Anando Kishore Dass 14 C.k 50 are clear authority in favour of this view. See also the learned discussion of the question by Mr. Justice Holloway in Valia Tamburatti v. Vira Rayan 1 M.j 228.

5. There is hardly any room for doubt in the face of the express language of Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act XV of 1877 which merely extinguishes the right to property when the period is determined for suits for recovery of such property. Whenever personal actions are barred, the rights themselves are not extinguished. That the principal debtor is not discharged by lapse of time may a