The main legal point established in the judgment is that the sale of a decree by the court can constitute a valid transfer by assignment in writing, as required by Order 21, Rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Pandrang Row, J.

1. This is an appeal from the order of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Madura dated 21st October, 1935 recognising the transfer of the decree in O.S. No. 147 of 1928 in favour of the petitioner and directing execution to proceed. The decree in question was obtained by the receiver appointed in O.S. No. 71 of 1920 and that decree constituted one of the assets of the partnership, the affairs of which were involved in O.S. No. 71 of 1920, the receiver himself being one of the partners. The appellant in this appeal is also one of the partners. It was found in August 1931 by the Court before whom this suit, O.S. No. 71 of 1920, was pending that the receiver appointed was unable to do anything to protect the assets of the firm from being lost by the bar of limitation. Accordingly it decided to assume the reins of control in its own hands. By an order dated 20th August, 1931 it was decided by the Court that as the outstandings were getting time-barred they should be sold in the Court premises by a Commissioner to be appointed and that the bidding at the sale would be confined to the parties to the suit, and the same order directed the receiver not to do any work as receiver after 31st August. The preamble to this order clearly sets forth the circumstances which led to the making of this order. It runs as follows:

These are parties who will not merely cut off their noses to spite their faces, but will cut off their own heads to spite their bodies. They have been wrangling for years, instead of dividing the outstandings, or dividing the sale proceeds of their outstandings and going home. In the meanwhile the outstandings are getting barred.

2. There can be no doubt that it was within the jurisdiction of the Court to dispense with the receiver and to take such steps itself as were necessary for the protection of the assets of the partnership. The method employed by the Court, namely to sell the assets by sale in Court to such of the partners as were willing to bid cannot also be said to have been without jurisdiction. In any case it is not contended that the order was without jurisdiction and the propriety of the order cannot be questioned at this stage as that order has become final. In accordance with that order the Commissioner had actually sold the decree now in question, namely, the decree in O.S. No. 147 of 1928 and the purchaser of that decree was the second defendant, one of the partners. The sale was held on the 25th September, 1931, and there was an order passed by the Court on 30th September after hearing the parties approving of this sale along with other sales held at the same time. The purchaser, thereupon, applied to execute the decree as transferee-decree-holder in E.P. No. 181 of 1932. Notice of this petition was given to the judgment debtors as well as the appellant and none of them put forward any objection to the execution of the decree by the 2nd defendant purchaser. The ex-receiver, that is to say, the plaintiff, put forward an objection to the effect that the second defendant has no locus standi to execute the decree in the absence of any assignment in writing in his favour. This objection, however, was not decided by the Court as the execution petition itself was not proceeded with further and was struck off the file. Sometime after the petition was struck off the second defendant purchaser again applied to the Court and again the Court confirmed the sale afresh. It was after the second confirmation of the sale that the present petition to execute the decree was made by the second defendant. The objection taken to the application was that the petitioner was not entitled to proceed in execution as the decree in question had not been transferred to him by assignment in writing or by operation of law. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed this objection as being frivolous and vexatious, and accordingly recognised the petitioner as the transferee-decree-holder and directed execution to pro