The legal principle established is that a decree obtained against a firm cannot be executed against the properties of minors who are not parties to the decree.

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

1. This appeal raises a question of some importance. The plaintiffs - The National City Bank of New York--obtained a decree on 19th June, 1934, in the High Court at Rangoon for about Rs. 25,000 against two defendants, with first of whom alone we are concerned. The first defendant is described in the plaint as "R.M.P.M. Chettiar firm, carrying on business at No. 84, Mogul Street Rangoon. " In execution of the decree, the plaintiff bank attached certain properties, which on their own showing belong to the four minors (the appellants before us) constituting a joint undivided Hindu family. The subordinate Judge of Coimbatore, in whose Court the decree was being executed disallowed the objections preferred on behalf of the minors and made an order allowing execution. The objection, which is material for the present purpose, has been raised in the following form:

The suit and the proceedings that ended in the said ex parte decree and the proceedings m the execution taken out after the decree are wholly incompetent and the attachment effected of the properties...is wholly illegal.

2. Further on it is stated:

The firm has no legal entity and there can be no decree against a firm without any agent or partner being represented. Further all the propertors of said firm are minors and there is no adult proprietor and a decree obtained without any representation on behalf of the minor proprietors is wholly void and it is a nullity.

3. It will be seen, that it is here assumed, that the suit has been filed under the procedure applicable to suits against firms which under Order 30, Rules 1 to 9 may be instituted in the names of the firms. The plaintiff bank replied, that although the first defendant in the suit was described as a firm as already stated they (the bank) did not intend to adopt the procedure applicable to firms but the provision of law under which the suit was brought, was Order 30, Rule 10 applicable to actions against persons carrying on business in assumed names. In order to make the contentions of the parties clear, we may briefly set forth what appear to be undisputed facts. One Muthuveerappa Chetty, a member of the Nattukottai Chetty community was carrying on money-lending business under the name of "R.M P.M. Chettiar Firm". He died in 1931, leaving his undivided sons (the appellants) all four of whom were and have been minors. Their mother, one Meenakshi Achi continued the business on their behalf with the aid of an agent, by name Veerappa Chetty and the suit debt was incurred in December 1932, in the course of that business. The suit was then filed and attempts made to effect personal service of the summons on the agent having proved unsuccessful, an order for substituted service was obtained, copies of the summons were affixed and the decree as mentioned above was made.

4. The first question is, does the procedure prescribed by Order 30 in regard to suits against firms in the firm name apply? In the first place, it is impossible to regard the minors as constituting a partnership firm. In the Indian Partnership Act 1932, partnership is described as the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business (Section 4). The next section goes on to say that the relation of partnership arises from contract and not from status. It follows that a minor, who is incapable of contracting, cannot be a partner. Further, it is incomprehensible that four persons, who were all minors, can agree with each other to form a partnership. Then, turning to Section 30, it enacts that a minor can never be a partner, although "he may be admitted to the benefits of partnership". Under the section, the adult partners, by a contract between themselves, can agree to confer this benefit upon a minor: in other words, the relation of partnership is the result of contract; and where any benefit is reserved to a minor, that arises not from a contract with the minor but between the adult partners. From this the