The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the term 'is hereditary' in the context of hereditary succession to the office of trustee as specified in Section 9, Clause 5(b) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act.

Varadachariar, J.

1. This appeal and the connected revision petition arise out of an application under Section 80(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (I of 1925), in respect of the temple of Sri Ranganadhaswami at Hospet. In the first instance, it was claimed both before the Board and before the District Court that the temple was a private one but that part of the claim has not been pressed and the only point remaining to be determined is whether or not it falls within the definition of "an excepted temple" in Section 9(5) of the Act.

2. The learned District Judge has referred to one or two errors into which the Board had fallen when passing its order dated 21st April, 1926. As the learned District Judge has dealt with the matter fully, I do not see that anything turns upon the errors found in the Boards order. The learned District Judge has held that though the petitioners grandfather one Mr. Chelapathi Rao Naidu was the founder (wholly or at least in part) of the temple about the year 1870 it is not possible to say that the right to succession to the office of trustee in this case is hereditary, as required by Section 9, Clause 5(b) (as it stood prior to the amendment in 1930). This conclusion is based on his finding that after the death of the original Chelapathi Rao Naidu, the management has not been in the hands of his heirs but of some persons related to him by marriage. The evidence shows that the management has for a long time been in the hands of some agents, namely, P.W. 5 and his father and uncle. In some of the documents reference is made to one or another of Chelapathi Rao Naidus relations but beyond that it is difficult to find any indication of the part that they took in the management. As regards the petitioner, it is not possible to say from the evidence that he took any part in the management till disputes arose between the agent and the local temple committee.

3. In the ordinary course, I should have followed he judgment of the Full Bench in Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras (1933) 66 M.L.J. 43 : I.L.R. 57 Mad. 271 and held that no appeal lay. But Mr. Ganapathi Aiyar contended that that judgment required reconsideration, in the light of the decision of the Privy Council in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin (1934) 66 M.L.J. 404 : L.R. 61 IndAp 158 : I.L.R. 12 Rang. 194 . It is true that the decision in the Rangoon case was pronounced after the judgment of the Full Bench but I do not find in it the enunciation of any new principle not present to the minds of the learned Judges who pronounced the Full Bench decision. In the recent case, their Lordships only reaffirmed the principle of their earlier decision in Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao (1916) 31 M.L.J. 324 : L.R. 43 IndAp 192 : I.L.R. 39 Mad. 617 and that judgment has been considered at great length in the Full Bench judgments. Mr. Ganapathi Aiyar suggested that two at least of the learned Judges who took part in the Full Bench case have proceeded on the footing that Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao (1916) 31 M.L.J. 324 : L.R. 43 IndAp 192 : I.L.R. 39 Mad. 617 turned upon the language of the definition of "decree" found in the Code of 1882, and therefore afforded no guidance under the Code of 1908; and he asked us to say that the decision in Maung BaThaw v. Ma Pin (1934) 66 M.L.J. 404 : L.R. 61 IndAp 158 : I.L.R. 12 Rang. 194 shows that that assumption is not right. Whatever may be said against some of the observations in the Full Bench case, I do not understand the basis of the Full Bench decision to be as assumed by Mr. Ganapathi Aiyar. It seems to me to proceed on the footing that the Religious Endowments Act has by its own scheme clearly indicated a distinction between cases in which questions arising under it are to be dealt with by a Civil Court as in a "suit" and cases in which questions are to be dealt with in a Civil Court as on an "application". In the latter case, it ca