IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS FULL BENCH
M. Venkatasubba Rao, Kt., Officiating C.J.
Madana Mohana Naiko
Versus
Krupasindhu Naiko dead and Ors.
Decided On : 07.10.1936
The case involved a question of whether the appellate court could require the appellant to pay the proper court fee in the Court of First Instance. The court examined the provisions of Section 12 of the Court-Fees Act and various interpretations by previous cases. The court concluded that the decision as to the proper court fee is final as between the parties, and the appellate court has the power to require the party to pay additional fee if the question has been wrongly decided to the detriment of the revenue.
M. Venkatasubba Rao, Kt., Officiating C.J.
1. The question of law-referred to the Full Bench for determination is interesting and not covered by authority. When the appeal came to be heard by the referring Judges, it was found that the court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal was deficient and an order was thereupon made directing that the proper amount should be paid. So far the case presented no difficulty, but the question arose whether the learned Judges could require the appellant to pay the proper court-fee in the Court of First Instance. The doubt that has arisen, which has led to this reference, may be expressed as follows. Section 12 of the Court-Fees Act runs thus:
(i) Every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee chargeable under this chapter on a plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be decided by the Court in which such plaint or memorandum, as the case may be, is filed, and such decision shall be final as between the parties to the suit.
(ii) But whenever any such suit comes before a Court of Appeal, reference or revision, if such Court considers that the said question has been wrongly decided to the detriment of the revenue, it shall require the party by whom such fee has been paid to pay so much additional fee as would have been payable had the question been rightly decided, and the provisions of Section 10, paragraph 11, shall apply.
2. It seems to have been argued, that in what is termed valuation two different things are involved, first, the fundamental question of category and secondly, the question of appraisement, and, that it has been held in numerous decisions that the finality contemplated in the first sub-section, attaches to a decision relating to appraisement as distinguished from category. The next step in the argument seems to be, that the words "the said question" in the second part must receive the same interpretation as the expression "every question relating to valuation" in the first part and if that be so, when the decision relates to category, it does not attract the operation of the second part and the appellate Court cannot therefore make an order directing the deficiency to be made good. This contention appears to us to involve a fallacy. The words "every question" are of a comprehensive nature and there seems to be no reason why they should be construed in the restrictive sense suggested; indeed, some at any rate of the decided cases show that the view that a decision relating to category is not final, is not based upon any such limited construction. True, that in Annamalai Chetti v. Lieut.-Col. J.G. Cloete I.L.R.(1881) 4 Mad. 204, the learned Judges place upon the words the narrow meaning. They observe:
In our judgment the terms of the 12th section ought not to receive a larger interpretation than they fairly admit of. They do not declare the decision of the Court in which the plaint or appeal is filed final on all questions which may arise respecting the court-fee but on every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of the court-fee.
3. It is difficult to see, as observed in Muhammad Sadik v. Muhammad Jan I.L.R. (1888) 11 All. 91 , how a Court could determine the amount without deciding the question as to the relief sought that is the category to which a particular suit belongs) and how yet the relief sought is to be deemed as not comprised in the question relating to the valuation (at p. 93). On the other hand, in a later case on the point, namely, Lakshmi Amma v. Janamajayan Nambiar (1894)4MLJ183 , the learned Judges proceeded upon the footing that the word valuation comprises both the factors that is the category as well as the computation of value. Having said so, they felt constrained to hold in view of certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, that the question of valuation should be viewed in two aspects for the purpose of deciding when a decision as to valuation is final and when appealable.
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