The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for certification of payments under Order 21, Rule 2(1) and the application of constructive res judicata in execution proceedings.

Horwill, J.

1. On 26th June, 1923, Yellappu Bapanna obtained part satisfaction of her decree to the extent of Rs. 2,500 and in December of the same year she obtained another sum of Rs. 1,000. Both these amounts were certified. On 3rd August, 1924, Rs. 2,520 were paid to her but the payment was not certified. On 10th January, 1929, the decree was transferred to the present appellant by Ex. I. That document recites that two sums of Rs. 2,500 and 2,520 respectively had been collected towards the decree amount, that the decree holder is entitled to execute for the balance, and that she transferred her right to execute to the appellant. Both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court held that on a construction of Ex. I the right transferred to the appellant was to execute for such sum as was due after making the deductions mentioned in the deed. In second appeal Wadsworth, J., was of the same opinion and referred to the possibility that the document of transfer and the filing of E.P. No. 231 of 1929 by the appellant might amount to a certification within the meaning of Order 21, Rule 2. Against this judgment of Wadsworth, J., the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred.

2. The main point discussed in this appeal is whether in view of the terms of Ex. I, the appellant is entitled to ignore the uncertified payment. The argument of the earned Counsel for the appellant is that in spite of her admissions the decree^ holder herself could have executed for an amount which included this uncertified payment and that as she had conveyed all her rights under the decree to the appellant, he had the right to ignore this payment in executing the decree. Mr. Venkatarama Raju has argued with great insistency that the Full Bench case of this Court, Subramaniam v. Ramaswami (1932)62MLJ562 , concludes the matter; but in that case it was only decided that a transferee decree-holder was in no worse a position than the transferor and that the judgment-debtor was prevented by Order 21, Rule 2(3) from relying upon an uncertified payment. It was not considered how far the rights of the transferee-decree-holder would be determined by the terms of the transfer deed or affected by admissions that uncertified payments had been made. The fallacy in the argument of Mr. Venkatarama Raju lies in the supposition that a decree-holder has a right to execute for a sum uncertified which he can transfer to another person. Certainly Sub-rule 3 to Order 21, Rule 2 does not give a right to a decree-holder to ignore any payment against the decree amount. On the contrary, Sub-rule 1 says that he shall certify the payment. The purpose of Order 21, Rule 2(3) which merely prevents the judgment-debtor from pleading an uncertified payment, seems to be to avoid unnecessary delay and to obviate the trial of complicated issues in execution proceedings which might prevent decree-holders from realising promptly the fruit of their decrees. The transfer deed Ex. I expressly states that the decree-holder herself had no right to execute for this sum of Rs. 2,520 that she was entitled to execute only for the remainder, and that it was this right to execute for the remainder that she transferred to the appellant. It was because he could not execute for this uncertified amount that the consideration for the transfer was correspondingly decreased. No authority has been quoted to us for the contention of the earned Counsel for the appellant that the Court is bound to ignore the terms of the transfer deed and the rights that the transferee obtains under the deed. Moreover when examined by the Court on his application to transfer the decree, the appellant admitted that Ex. I gave him the right to execute only for what was due on the decree after deducting this uncertified payment. We therefore hold that the decision of our learned brother on this point was correct.

3. We are also of opinion that his judgment can be supported on the ground that the certification by the decree-ho