The main legal point established in the judgment is that while the appointment of a Receiver in a declaratory suit is within the Court's power, the lower Court has no jurisdiction to appoint a general Receiver while an appeal is pending.

Cornish, J.

1. The appeal is against the order of the Subordinate Judge appointing a Receiver. The appellant was the twenty-first plaintiff in a suit brought by a group of persons of the A.L. family against a group of defendants representing the V.R. family for a declaration that both these families were entitled to the management and trusteeship of certain temple properties under a scheme framed by agreement between the families in 1907. The plaint prayed further reliefs against the first defendant in particular by way of an injunction and for an account. The suit was decreed. The right of all the members of the A.L. and V.R. families to the trusteeship, as also the validity of the 1907 agreement and scheme, were declared; the first defendant was restrained from interfering with the rights of the A.L. family and he was directed to account for his management. For this purpose a commissioner was appointed and this commissioner was also appointed receiver for the special purpose of at once realising all the debts due to the devasthanam from the members of the A.L. and V.R. families and from strangers except tenants.

2. An appeal has been filed against the decree. It need only be observed with regard to the history of this dispute, subsequent to the decree, that the family discord and consequent difficulty in the management of the devasthanam property have continued unabated. An application was subsequently made to the Sub-Judge by the eleventh defendant praying that first plaintiff be directed not to act by himself in the management and that if he did not agree the Receiver appointed specially should be appointed to generally manage the affairs of the devasthanam. This application was resisted by the first plaintiff. The Court dismissed the application upon the ground that the Court has no further jurisdiction that the decree being under appeal to the High Court, the High Court was the tribunal to which the power of appointing a Receiver belonged. Twelve months or so later a fresh application was made to the Subordinate Court for the appointment of a general Receiver, this time by the plaintiffs other than twenty-first plaintiff who objected to the application. The Sub-Judge on this occasion, differing from his predecessor, held that he had jurisdiction to appoint a general Receiver. Hence the present appeal.

3. The earned Counsel for the appellant has urged two objections to the validity of the order of the Sub-Judge. Firstly, he has contended that it was not competent to the Court to appoint a Receiver in a declaratory suit; and, secondly, that the decree having in part become final and an appeal being pending, the lower Court had no jurisdiction to appoint a general Receiver.

4. With regard to the first contention I think it cannot be maintained. There is, of course, no scope for the appointment of a Receiver unless there is some property for him to receive. But whenever there is property which is the subject of dispute between litigants, or which is affected by the litigation, a Receiver of it can be appointed by the Court if the Court thinks it just and convenient to make the appointment. In Veeraraghava Thathachariar v. Krishnaswami Thathachariar (1908) 20 M.L.J. 638 where the suit was for a declaration that a scheme was binding on the parties and alternatively for the settlement of a scheme, and for the appointment of a Receiver, it was held that the Court had power to appoint a Receiver "the whole aim and object of the suit" it was said:

Is to regulate the collection and distribution of the property of the temple and even though there is no application for the removal of the Dharmakartha (in which case no doubt the Court would have power to appoint a Receiver) the subject is the same in both cases, namely, the property of the temple.

5. That was a suit governed by Section 503 of the former Procedure Code which limited the power of the Court to appoint a Receiver of property "the subject of the suit ". The power of the