The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Section 4 of the Impartible Estates Act, the distinction between necessity and benefit in alienations, and the right of co-ownership in an impartible estate.

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

1. This suit has been brought to enforce a simple mortgage granted to the plaintiff on 8th January, 1916 (Ex. A) by the first defendant and his father, the late Zamindar of Neduvasal to secure the re-payment of Rs. 8,300. It may be mentioned that the plaintiff was a usufructuary mortgagee under two earlier deeds executed in his favour on 16th December, 1910, for about Rs. 86,000. The suit mortgage comprises six villages, of which four have been subsequently sold by the first defendant and his father to the second defendant by Ex. F dated 14th August, 1919. The latter by Ex. H dated the 1st June, 1925, conveyed his interest to defendants 3 to 5 reciting in the deed that the original purchase was intended to be on their behalf.

2. The only persons contesting the suit are defendants 3 to 5. The first defendant, it may however be stated, originally filed a defence, but subsequently not only withdrew it but admitted the plaintiffs claim.

3. The villages in question are part of an impartible estate, of which the first defendants father was the proprietor at the time the suit mortgage was granted. Defendants 3 to 5 contend that the alienation was made without legal necessity and is consequently not binding on the estate under Section 4 of the Impartible Estates Act (Madras Act II of 1904). The effect of that section is that the power of the proprietor in regard to alienating his estate or binding it by his debts, is co-extensive with that of a manager of a joint Hindu family, not being a father or grandfather; in other words, the Act does not recognise the doctrine either of antecedent debt or of pious obligation. See Venkatalingamma Nayanim Bahadur v. Arunachellam Chettiar (1924) 19 L.W. 132. The short question therefore is, was the alienation made for a purpose which would have been held justifiable, had it been made by a manager of coparcenery property? Before dealing with the question, we may observe (and it is conceded), that it is unnecessary to enquire in this suit, what interest, if any, defendants 3 to 5 have acquired in the suit property by reason of the alienations mentioned above (Exs. F and H).

4. The mortgage amount of Rs. 8,300 consists of two parts:

(1) Rs. 4,892 borrowed for the purpose of redeeming from mortgage a property at Tanjore known as "Karnala Vilas".

(2) Rs. 3,408 borrowed for meeting the expenses of the marriage of the late Zamindars daughter, i.e., the first defendants sister. In regard to the former amount, the facts are these. The late Zamindar purchased a house known as Karnala Vilas on the 26th June, 1915, for Rs. 6,500. The house had been previously mortgaged and the Zamindar undertook to discharge the mortgage debt. This amounted to Rs. 4,892, which sum was paid from the amount borrowed from the plaintiff. If the original purchase of the house can be justified, it follows that this part of the debt must be held to be binding. This raises the question, what is the extent of a managers power in regard to buying property? It is not doubted that the power of the manager can be exercised not only in a case of need but also "for the benefit of the estate". This has been held in numerous cases which have followed Hunoomanpersaud v. Mussumat Babooee (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393 but as regards what is meant by the expression the benefit of the estate, there has been a conflict of judicial opinion. One view seems to be, that unless the transaction is of a defensive character, in the sense that it is calculated to protect the estate from some threatened danger or destruction, it cannot be said to be for the benefit of the estate. We are unable to place this narrow interpretation upon the words in question. If the true doctrine is that the "defensive character" is to be the test, the distinction between necessity and benefit disappears. For, suppose an alienation is made for raising funds to preserve some part of the estate from extinction, it is difficult to say in this instance whether the purpo