The main legal point established in the judgment is that an error of law can be considered apparent on the face of the record, justifying dismissal of a civil revision petition.

Wadsworth, J.

1. The appeal and the revision petition have been heard together because they both arise out of the same litigation, but the questions raised in them are really quite different.

2. In the second appeal the only question is whether the lower Court was wrong in law in refusing to excuse the delay in filing the appeal. Quite clearly the lower Court was not wrong in its decision at all unless an application for copies filed on 10th August, 1932, can be regarded as an application not only for a copy of the judgment but also for a copy of the decree. The application in terms only asks for "a copy of the order" and it was not until 3rd September, 1932, that, a memorandum was filed asking that the decree might be drafted and a copy of it might be granted. Now, if time had been running against the appellant until 3rd September, 1932, his appeal was time-barred. I am unable to say that the lower appellate Court committed any legal error in holding that the earlier application dated 10th August, 1932, was not an application for a copy of the decree and that there were no grounds for excising the delay. The result therefore is that the second appeal is dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal is refused.

3. The Civil Revision Petition relates to an order in review of an appellate judgment restoring a suit which had been dismissed for default. The review judgment was passed by a different District Judge from the gentleman who originally allowed the appeal, but this point is not 1 think material for the Judge who decided the appeal in the first instance actually admitted the review application and ordered notice of it. Now, the error which was put forward as an error on the face of the record justifying interference in review was an error of law which went to the root of the jurisdiction of the District Court which heard the appeal By Section 192 of the Madras Estates Land Act, Order 43, Civil Procedure Code, is excluded from the provisions governing procedure under the Estates Land Act. Therefore no appeal lay against the order of the Deputy Collector refusing to restore the suit which had been dismissed for default. It follows that the error of the learned Judge in allowing such an appeal was one which was apparent on the face of the record to any person well acquainted with the provisions of the Act by which the appeal was governed. No research was necessary into rulings in order to discover the nature of the error.

4. The leading decision of this Court on the question whether an error of law can be an error apparent on the face of the record such as is contemplated in Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, is that of Murari Rao v. Balavanth Dikshit AIR1924Mad98 , where the Bench approved of an order in review, treating as an error of law apparent on the face of the record one which was only apparent to a person acquainted with a particular ruling of this Court on a question of succession. That is to say, the case was one which was much weaker as a case for review, than the present case m which the error of law consists in overlooking a statutory provision, which, if not overlooked, would have made it clear to the Court that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal at all. Now, the correctness of the decision in Murari Rao v. Balavanth Dikshit AIR1924Mad98 has been doubted in a judgment of Waller, J., which resulted in a reference to a Full Bench in the case of China Venkatappayya v. Punnayya (1932) 65 M.L.J. 173 (F.B.). The learned Judge says:

Speaking for myself, I cannot understand how a mistake of law can be apparent on the face of the record. It may be apparent from a contrary decision of a superior Court, but that is not a part of the record.

5. The Full Bench which dealt with the reference found it unnecessary to decide the question whether a Judge has power to review his order on the ground of an error of law. I may remark that Krishnan Pandalai, J., who was also a member of the referring Bench along wi