The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between the cause of action for rent and mesne profits, emphasizing the need for identity of cause of action in the application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Venkataramana Rao, J.

1. This is a batch of 28 appeals which arise out of suits filed by the Maharajah of Pithapuram the respondent herein against his tenants the defendants for recovery of arrears of rent for occupation of lands in various villages which originally formed part of what was known as Thotapalli estate to which the plaintiff claimed title by a purchase by his predecessor-in-title. The arrears of rent were claimed from faslis 1332 to 1343. The liability to pay rent was not disputed but most of the suits were resisted mainly on the ground of limitation and some were resisted on the ground that they were barred by Order 2, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. In answer to the plea of limitation the plaintiff relied on Section 14 of the Limitation Act on the ground that a prior litigation against the same tenants in Civil Court saved limitation. In answer to the plea raised by Order 2, Rule 2, the plaintiff also relied on the pendency of the prior litigation in respect of the claims which are sought to be defeated by this technical plea. The Deputy Collector upheld the plea of the defendants as to limitation but overruled the plea as to Order 2, Rule 2 and gave decrees on that basis, but the learned District Judge differed from the Deputy Collector on the question of limitation in its entirety. Against his judgment the tenants have preferred these appeals.

2. The material facts are few and are not in dispute. That the plaintiff owned the several villages wherein the lands in the occupation of the tenants were situate was not disputed but the tenants disputed the right of the landlord to the ownership of the soil of the lands, their case being they are tenants owning kudivaram right in the lands. The plaintiffs case was that he was the owner of both the warams and that he was entitled to evict the tenants from occupation of the lands after due notice to quit. He therefore issued notices to quit between 1921 and 1923 and filed suits in the Civil Court. Most of the suits were for ejectment. He combined in the same suits with the relief for ejectment reliefs for past profits and future profits; in some of them he claimed also past rents and future profits. Some of the suits were only for mesne profits though in some of them he claimed rent also in the alternative. In a few of the suits he claimed only rent. The tenants resisted the various claims. So far as the claim for ejectment was concerned, the tenants plea was that the landlord had no right to eject as they were the owners of kudivaram right and therefore had occupancy rights. This plea was also available for them to resist the claim for mesne profits. So far as the claim for rent was concerned, their plea was that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain suits for rent. Most of the suits were launched about 1925 excepting certain suits for rent which were filed as and when the right to recover them were about to be barred. The litigation lasted for nearly ten years and it was finally decided by the High Court that the tenants had the kudivaram right and the plaintiff was not entitled to eject them. As the lands in the occupation of the several tenants formed part of an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction to award relief on the basis of a subsisting relationship between landlord and tenant. Therefore the Court directed the plaints in the various suits to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court. The various plaints were accordingly taken from the Civil Courts and presented on the very same day in the Revenue Courts. In presenting the plaints to the Revenue Courts the plaintiff in some suits amended them by claiming also rent for faslis subsequent to the fasli in respect whereof claims were preferred in the Civil Court; in some cases he claimed interest which was omitted to be asked for in the Civil Court; but the amendments in some cases were not made on the day on which the pl