The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of legislative provisions governing the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus and the validity of the rules regulating the issue of the writ.

Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.

1. This Full Bench has been constituted to decide a matter referred under Rule 2 of the Rules applying to this Court in its appellate jurisdiction by Burn and Stodart, JJ., sitting as a Bench dealing with criminal cases. The matter involves the important question whether this Court has the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus as known to the English Common Law or whether its powers are confined in this respect to those conferred by Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which gives authority to issue directions "of the nature of a habeas corpus. There are other questions involved in the reference and for their proper appreciation it is necessary to set out the course of events.

2. The respondents are the directors of the Travancore National and Quilon Bank, Limited, a company registered under the laws of the State of Travancore. A petition for the compulsory winding up of the company was recently granted by this Court and official liquidators have been appointed. On the night of the 20th October, 1938, the respondents were arrested in Madras in pursuance of extradition warrants issued under Section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903, for their arrest and surrender to the police of the Travancore State for production before the District Magistrate, Trivandrum, which is the capital of the State. It was alleged that the respondents had committed within the State of Travancore offences under the sections of the Travancore Penal Code corresponding to Sections 409, 418, 420, 477-A. 109 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and the District Magistrate at Trivandrum ordered their arrest. The extradition warrants were directed to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Madras, and under his orders the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, Madras, arrested the respondents. The respondents were produced before the Chief Presidency Magistrate at 8-30 A.M. on the 21st October and the intention was to send them under arrest to the frontier of the Travancore State by the train leaving Madras at 11 A.M. Before the respondents were brought before the Chief Presidency Magistrate an application had been made to Pandrang Row, J., for theMssue of a writ of habeas corpus and for an interim order prohibiting their removal from Madras. The application was made under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the heading of the petition shows. The matter being urgent the learned Judge granted the interim order asked for and directed the Chief Presidency Magistrate to detain the respondents in his custody pending the further orders of the High Court, which meant pending the hearing of the main application. The interim order was served on the Chief Presidency Magistrate and the respondents were detained in accordance with the order. Later in the day the Crown Prosecutor presented a petition asking that the interim order be vacated on the ground that it had been passed without jurisdiction and was therefore null and void. The petition having been filed the Crown Prosecutor applied to me in Chambers to hear it. As I considered that sitting alone I had no power to deal with the matter I declined to do so. The Crown Prosecutor then applied to Pandrang Row, J., to vacate his own order. The learned Judge heard the arguments the next morning, the 22nd October, but refused to withdraw the interim order, intimating that he would give his reasons on Monday, the 24th October. The main application was in the list for that day of Burn and Stodart, JJ., who composed the Bench dealing with criminal matters. Rule 2-A of the Rules of this Court in its appellate jurisdiction requires an application for a writ of habeas corpus to be placed before the Bench dealing with criminal matters. The Court usually sits at 10-45 A.M., but Pandrang Row, J., delivered his judgment at 10-30 A.M. on the 24th October. Not only did he refuse to vacate the interim order but he held that Rule 2-A of the Appellate Side Rules was ultra vires