The main legal point established in the judgment is the need to consider changes in circumstances, conventional necessities, and the income of the family when determining and enhancing maintenance for a Hindu widow, while also emphasizing the limitations on granting lump sums for specific purposes and the importance of adhering to the judicial decision already passed.

Wadsworth, J.

1. This appeal arises out of a suit for the enhancement of maintenance ordered to a Hindu widow by a decree of the year 1899. The original rate of maintenance Was Rs. 10 per mensem. The Courts below have raised this figure to Rs. 50 per mensem, allowing also a lump sum for pilgrimage not provided for in the original decree and another lump sum for the replacement of worn out utensils. The lower appellate Court differing from the trial Court allowed arrears only from the date of the trial Courts decree instead of arrears from the date on which payment under the earlier decree had ceased. This question of the date from which arrears are to be paid forms the subject-matter of the memorandum of cross-objections.

2. There are findings of fact, into which it is unnecessary ;for me to enter, that in the interval from; the 1st decree of 1899 to the date of the present suit, the income of the family; property had arisen from Rs. 1,100 a year to a little over Rs. 7,000 a year, that is to say, the increase in the rate of maintenance allowed is something less than the proportionate increase having regard to the rise in the income of the family. The plaintiff herself in her evidence regarding the prices of the main items of expenditure during this period, estimated the rise of the price of paddy as from Rs. 60 to 150 and the rise in the price of clothes as from Rs. 5 to 12 to 15. This would indicate, if the evidence were accepted as correct, that the rise of prices of the principal commodities required for her consumption, amounts to something less than 300 per cent.

3. The basis upon which the maintenance of a widow is to be fixed in the first instance is well settled. It should be fixed so far as means are available, at art amount which will enable her to live comfortably, according to the standard of comfort obtaining in the community to which she belongs. In fixing the figure regard will be had to the amount of money available and the ordinary rule is that the maximum allowance which she should get would be an amount equal to the income of her husbands share in the property Rangathayi Ammal v. Munuswami Chetty (1911)21MLJ706 and Subbarayulu Chetti v. Kamalavali Thayaramma (1911)21MLJ493 . In the cases just quoted, the income of the husbands share was taken to be the income of the share which he would have got if a division had taken place in his lifetime. That appears also to be the basis of the decision in Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma (1902)12MLJ270 , where the rate of maintenance is treated as being limited to the share of the deceased husband which has come by survivorship to the coparcener. But on this question of the date with effect from which the husbands share is to be estimated, there is a very clear ruling of a Bench of this Court in Manikka Mudaliar v. Soubagia Ammal AIR1915Mad26 which is later than the cases just referred to and, so far as I know, has not been challenged by subsequent rulings of this Court, in the 24 years which had elapsed since the decision was passed. In that case, it was definitely laid down that the maximum amount of maintenance of a widow should be fixed with reference to the income from the husbands share, not calculated as on the date of his death, but as on the date of the suit, regard being had to the increase of the family, property which had taken place in the interval between the date of the husbands death and the date of the suit. That decision must be taken as authoritative, at least so far as I am concerned. I think it follows that in a suit for enhancement of maintenance, the maximum which could be awarded to the widow would be the amount of the income of the share to which her deceased husband would have been entitled had he been alive and a coparcener at the date of the suit for enhancement.

4. What are the considerations which must govern the Court in dealing with a claim for enhancement of maintenance already fixed by the Courts decree? Clearly, the matter must