King, J.

1. This appeal arises out of an application by the decree-holder in O.S. No. 24 of 1929 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Vizagapatam, to execute against defendants 2, 6 and 7, the decree which he obtained against them ex parte on 5th March, 1930. There was an application to the Subordinate Judge to set aside this ex parte decree which was dismissed. Against this order of dismissal defendants 1 and 3 to 5 appealed to the High Court. On 20th October, 1932, the High Court gave judgment allowing the appeal, and extending its benefits to defendants 2, 6 and 7 also on condition that they deposited the decree amount within three months. This deposit was not however made, and so as against defendants 2, 6 and 7 the ex parte decree stood confirmed as from 20th October, 1932. The present application for execution was made on 15th August, 1935. It has been dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge as being filed more than three years after the date of the decree and the question before us is whether that order of dismissal is in accordance with law.

2. The law which applies to these facts is formulated in Article 182 of the Limitation Act. The description of the application in column 1 is, For the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court.... The period of limitation in column 2 is three years. The time from which period begins to run in column 3 is (1) the date of the decree or order, (2) (where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court.... If the first date is to be chosen in the present case the execution application is clearly barred - if the second, it is clearly within time, and the very simple question for our determination is whether the words where there has been an appeal apply to the present case or not. Simple, however, as these words are, they have been in the past interpreted in two distinct ways. According to the first interpretation appeal can and must mean only an appeal against the actual decree or order sought to be executed. The second interpretation gives it a wider meaning which for the present we may best express in the words of Venkataramana Rao, J., in Koyakutti v. Veerankutti AIR1937Mad421 as:

An appeal in the suit which is likely to affect the decree sought to be executed.

3. Although this more liberal interpretation was adopted more than fifty years ago in Narsingh Sewak Singh v. Madho Das I.L.R. (1882) All. 274 and Lutful Huq v. Sumbhudin Pattuck I.L.R. (1881) Cal. 248, the current of authority thereafter set strongly against it, so that by 1927 the learned Judges who decided Fakir Chand Mandal v. Daiba Charan Parni I.L.R. (1927) Cal. 1052 were able to hold that the first view was both clear upon principle and concluded by authority. Then came the decision of the Privy Council in Nagendranath De v. Sureshchandra De (1932) 63 M.L.J. 329 : L.R. 59 IndAp 283 : I.L.R. 60 Cal. 1 (P.C.) and of the four cases decided since then, Nagappa Bandappa v. Gurushantappa Shankrappa (1932) I.L.R. Bom. 388, Firm Dedhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwan Das I.L.R. (1937) Pat. 305, Ahammad Kutty v. Kottekkat Kuttu (1932) 64 M.L.J. 251 : I.L.R. 56 Mad. 458 and Koyakutti v. Veerankutti AIR1937Mad421 only one has failed to take the more liberal view.

4. With all respect to the learned Judges in Fakir Chand Mandal v. Daiba Charan Parni I.L.R. (1927) Cal. 1052, we are unable to see how the narrower view which they uphold is "clear upon principle". The only principle we can discover in the rulings cited for the respondents is that the words where there has been an appeal must be taken in their context, that is to say, with reference to the words in column 1 of Article 182. But it does not necessarily follow that because a decree or order is mentioned in column 1 the appeal which is mentioned in column 3 must be against that decree or order. It is equally logical to say that it must be something which affects that decree or order, and after all, the legislature ha