The burden of proving that a will was executed by the testator in a sound disposing state of mind lies on the propounders of the will, and this burden is particularly heavy where there are suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will.

Varadachariar, J.

1. These appeals arise out of the same suit and raise the same question for decision. The appellants are some of the legatees under a will (marked Ex. I) said to have been executed by one Sanjeevi Sundaram Pillai on 2nd September 1930; and the point for decision is whether the said will was executed by the deceased in a sound disposing state of mind (issue 1). Ex. I was registered at the residence of the deceased at 10 A.M. on 3rd September 1930 and the testator died after midnight of 4th September, i.e., early (2 A.M.) on 5th morning. The suit was instituted by the widow on 23rd February 1931, for a declaration that Ex. 1 was invalid and void and did not affect her rights under the Hindu law and under a prior will (Ex. B), dated 7th August 1930. As there were disputes about possession, the plaint also prayed for reliefs by way of injunction and delivery of possession (if necessary). The defendants may be divided into four groups. Defendant 1 who receives the largest benefit under Ex. I, valued at Rs. 12,100 was the divided brother of the deceased. Defendant 2 who is given about Rs. 4000 worth of property was his sister and the wife of defendant 3. Defendants 4 to 9 are bandhus of the deceased, to whom property worth Rs. 3000 in all, is bequeathed in three shares. Defendants 3 and 10 are not beneficiaries but have been impleaded as having taken a prominent part in bringing about the will. Defendant 4 asserted an independent title to the estate; he was therefore exonerated from this suit and may accordingly be left out of account. Defendants 3 and 10 denied that they took any improper part in connexion with the will. They contended that they had been unnecessarily impleaded in the suit. As defendant 10 was one of the attesters to the will, he added that the will was freely and openly executed by the deceased when in a sound state of mind and with full knowledge of its contents. The legatee defendants (other than the fourth) supported the will.

2. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion, that though Ex. I had been signed by the deceased, the defendants had not proved that it was voluntarily executed by him in a sound disposing state of mind and that they had not cleared up the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the second will so soon after the first will and altering its provisions in a. material manner. He accordingly passed a. decree substantially in terms of the prayer in the plaint. Defendant 1 has not chosen to appeal against the decree and has been impleaded as a respondent. Defendant 2 has filed A.S. No. 115 and defendants 5 to 9 have preferred A.S. No. 201. It is well established that whenever a will is prepared; and executed under circumstances which; raise the suspicion of the Court, it lies on the propounders not merely to prove the execution of the will, in the sense that it was signed by the testator, but also to adduce evidence which removes such suspicion and to satisfy the Court that the testator knewt and approved of the contents of the will see Tyrrell v. Painton (1894) L.R.P. 151 8 Pat 3822 and Sarat Kumari Devi v. Sakhichand (1929) 16 A.I.R. P.C. 45 and Vellaswami Servai v. Sivaraman Servai. In applying this rule, the question has sometimes been raised, what is the kind of suspicion contemplated by this rule? It is sufficient, for the purposes of this case, to refer to the facts of the cases last cited, as indicating some of the grounds of suspicion, because similar grounds also exist here. It seems to me that the existence of very material differences between two wills said to have been executed within a short interval is undoubtedly a circumstance calling for explanation. I do not deny that it is open to a testator to vary his dispositions as he pleases and if the Court is satisfied that the later document represents his voluntary, act, it is not for the Court to substitute its view of reasonableness in place of the testators view. It may also be concede